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EXPENDITURE CREATE OR
ENHANCE AN ASSET
ALAN GUNN*
The typical judicial opinion in an income tax case concerning
capital expenditures consists of little more than a description of the
expenditure in question and a conclusion that it is, or is not, capital.
General agreement prevails that some costs must be capitalized
because they are so closely related to the production of future years'
income that a current deduction would not clearly reflect income.'
But nearly every business expenditure has some impact on the
future, and the cases distinguishing capital expenditures from "ordi-
nary and necessary expenses" do not exhibit any easily-described
pattern. The Board of Tax Appeals once observed that in capital
expenditure cases "no court has ever yet attempted to make a
definition that can apply to any case except the one under review." 2
The Second Circuit, finding that "the rulings and decisions are in a
state of hopeless confusion," 3 has suggested that prayer and fasting
are in some way appropriate conduct for those faced with a capitali-
zation problem. 4
In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association, 5 de-
cided in 1971, the Supreme Court, noting that many deductible
expenditures have some effect beyond the taxable year, justified
Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law; B.S., Rensselaer'
Polytechnic Institute, 1961; J.D., Cornell University, 1970.
The necessity of capitalizing at least some expenditures is obvious only so long as one
accepts the proposition that no tax deduction should be allowed for money saved, since most
capital expenditures may be viewed as savings. For a discussion of the arguments for and
against exempting savings from taxation, see N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax 79-101 (1955).
American Seating Co., 4 B.T.A. 649, 658 (1926), acquiesced in part, nonacquiesced in
part, VIM Cum. Bull. 2 (1928).
3
 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973).
4 Id.
5
 403 U.S. 345 (1971) (Blackmun, J.).
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capitalization of the expenditure in question by finding that it served
"to create or enhance . . . what is essentially a separate and distinct
additional asset."6
 Although the Second Circuit has said that this
language "has brought about a radical shift in emphasis," nothing
in the Lincoln Savings & Loan opinion suggests that the Co-urt was
doing anything more than describing the existing law on the subject.
The regulations provide that expenditures that "[result] in the crea-
tion of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially
beyond the close of the taxable year" are not deductible. 8 The
converse of this rule, that expenditures that do not result in the
creation of an asset are currently deductible even though they relate
to future years' income, was also reasonably well-established before
Lincoln Savings & Loan; Judge Tannenwald's concurring opinion in
David J. Primuth 9
 describes the cases as limiting capitalization to
"cases of acquisition of tangible assets or intangible assets, such as a
license or goodwill of a going business, or preparation for engaging
in a new field of endeavor." 10
 The tendency of the courts to think of
a capital expenditure as something associated with assets rather than
as a guide to the proper determination of income may derive from
the old emphasis on the balance sheet as the primary financial
statement." Thus, in Wyoming National Bank, 12 the Board of Tax
Appeals held that excess "rental" payments made to induce a lessor
to speed up construction of a building should not be capitalized
because the payments gave the taxpayer no asset that it could show
on its books." The case is probably wrong in this respect," but the
Id. at 354. The significance of the requirement that the asset created or enhanced be a
"separate and distinct additional" one is not clear, if capitalization were limited to costs that
"create" an asset, "separate and distinct" might be viewed as reflecting the distinction drawn
in the cases cited in note 68 infra. But the quoted phrase describes as capital expenditures
those costs that "enhance" an existing asset as well; thus it cannot be read as limiting capital
expenditures to costs that give the taxpayer some asset that he did not have before the
expenditure was incurred. It is hard to conceive of a cost that creates or enhances an asset that
is not "separate and distinct" from some other asset.
7 Briarcliff, 475 F.2d at 782.
g Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1973) (cash method taxpayers); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)
(1973) (accrual method taxpayers).
9
 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
16 Id. at 381, 382 (concurring opinion).
" The tendency today is to regard the income statement as more significant than the
balance sheet. Statement of the Accounting Principles Board, Oct. 1, 1970, CCH Accounting
Princ. §§ 1022.04; 1026.36.
12
 23 B.T.A. 408, acquiesced in, X-2 Cum. Bull, 78 (1931).
13
 23 B.T.A. at 411.
14
 There is some authority for the deduction of payments for the early delivery of goods
either as a business expense, 0.0. 664, 3 Cum. Bull. 131 (1920), declared obsolete by Rev.
Rul. 69-661, 1962-2 Corn. Bull. 111, or as depreciation, Frank & Seder Co. v. Commissioner,
44 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1930); Atwater Kent Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1930). However, the weight of authority is that such payments are merely part of the purchase
price of the goods and must be capitalized. Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d
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Board's attention to the balance sheet is instructive. In any event,
even if the limitation of the capital expenditure concept to the costs
of producing or enhancing an asset did not originate with Lincoln
Savings & Loan, the clear statement of the limitation in a Supreme
Court opinion will undoubtedly increase the attention that is paid to
the search for an asset in capitalization cases.
The term "asset" is usually used in tax cases as a synonym for
"property," although as a matter of accounting theory an "asset" is
nothing more than a capitalized cost, t 5
 which will be recognized as
an expense through depreciation, amortization or depletion in what-
ever future accounting periods are appropriate. 16 The names on the
asset side of a balance sheet are not the names of pieces of property;
they are the names of costs. If capitalization were approached with
this in mind, it would be inaccurate to say that a particular expendi-
ture must be capitalized because it has produced an asset; one
should say instead that there is an asset because a particular expen-
diture has been capitalized. While this view of capitalization has
occasionally been recognized in tax cases," the usual approach has
been to base the decision whether to capitalize an expenditure upon
the result of a determination that the expenditure has produced an
asset. Since the word "asset" is used in everyday speech to mean a
piece of property, it is perhaps not surprising that the peculiar use of
that term in accounting parlance has been ignored. In most cases the
distinction between, asset as cost and asset as property is of no
practical significance, since the typical capital expenditure does pro-
duce something that can be regarded as tangible or intangible prop-
erty. Thus, in the typical case, there is no particular reason to take
care to observe that when one says "asset" in connection with an
expenditure one means the expenditure itself and not the thing
acquired as a result of the expenditure. Recognition that the assets
on a balance sheet are costs rather-than pieces of property does not
compel the conclusion that the rule limiting capital expenditures to
costs associated with the production of property is unsound. The
Cir. 1966); Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 27 T.C. 733 (1957), acquiesced in, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 7;
W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932), appeal dismissed, 68 F.2d 1022 (6th
Cir. 1934); Robert Buedingen, 6 E.T.A. 335'(1927); Rev. Rul. 70-332, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 3];
cf. McCulley Ashlock, 18 T.C. 405 (1952). The denial of a deduction in these cases is
attributable in part to a concern that allowing the deduction would encourage artificial
characterization of part of the cost of assets as early delivery payments. Sears; supra, at 197.
15
 De Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting (pt. I), 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1001, 1020-21
(1962).
16
 Alternatively, if the asset is the cost of an item that does not have a limited life, such as
land or the purchased goodwill of a going business, it will be recognized in the period when
the asset is sold.
17
 See Rev. Rul. 68-483, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 91, which apparently treats the cost of
periodic redredging of a slip rather than the slip itself as the asset in question.
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limitation may be perfectly reasonable; but it is important to under-
stand that it is a limitation, not something inherent in the nature of
capitalization.
The distinction between asset as cost and asset as property may
be helpful in determining. the proper period for recovery of
capitalized costs through depreciation or amortization. Two Tax
Court cases" have denied depreciation of landscaping costs on the
ground that the costs enhance an asset—land—that does not have a
limited useful life. If landscaping must be repeated periodically,
denial of depreciation in such a case results in taxing something
more than net income. Unless landscaping is performed at least
annually a current deduction would distort income, but recovery of
the cost through depreciation over the period between landscapings
should be permitted. Recognition that the "asset" in such cases is the
cost itself, which might be called "deferred landscaping cost," rather
than what is purchased with the cost, may help to avoid this kind of
error. ' 9
This article will examine several aspects of the capital expendi-
ture problem with a view toward determining whether it is ever
reasonable to permit a current deduction for expenditures having
some future impact and whether such expenditures can reasonably
be classified as capital or current on the basis of the connection
between the expenditure and something that can be called an asset.
Particular emphasis will be given to cases in which expenditures are
held to be deductible notwithstanding their relation to the produc-
tion of income in future years, because the result of the expenditure
is not an asset. After brief discussion of the statutory provisions
concerning capital expenditures and the problem of whether
capitalization is a "method of accounting," three kinds of capital
expenditure problems will be discussed. The capital nature of
ground rent and insurance during the construction of a building will
be examined in order to determine the nature of the relationship
between a cost and an asset necessary to require capitalization of the
15 Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 241 (1959), acquiesced in, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 5; Algernon
Blair, Inc., ,29 T.C. 1205 (1958). But cf. Alabama-Georgia Syrup Co., 36 T.C. 747 (1961),
acquiesced in, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 3, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Whitfield v. Commis-
sioner, 311 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1962), where the Commissioner allowed depreciation of the
costs of shrubbery.
"' The problem here is not so much the allocatirin of the cost to the wrong asset as it is
the failure to recognize that there is an asset distinct from the land. It may be possible to avoid
this error without recourse to treating the cost itself as the asset if one is willing to regard some
incidental product of the landscaping, such as shrubbery, as a separate depreciable asset, but
this approach seems somewhat strained, and there are other situations where it is unsatisfac-
tory. Thus, in Rev. Rut. 68-483, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 91, depreciation of the cost of periodic
redredging of a channel (though not of the cost of the initial dredging) was allowed. The
dredging cost is described as an "intangible asset."
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cost, and to determine whether the distinction between the treat-
ment afforded ground rent and insurance can be explained on "pro-
duction of an asset" grounds. The capital nature of educational
expenditures will then be considered, in an effort to determine
whether the nondeductibility of some educational expenditures can
be explained on capital expenditure grounds and whether the educa-
tional expense cases are consistent with the limitation of capital
expenditures to costs that produce an asset. Finally, the capital
nature of the costs of expanding a business will be considered in
order to determine whether the distinctions that are drawn in this
area can be explained by classifying the results of those costs as
"assets" or "not assets. " 20
" This selection of topics does not by any means exhaust the capital expenditure area.
Some problems other than those listed here, such as the distinction between repairs and
improvements, will be discussed briefly in connection with other matters. See text at notes
62-71 infra. There are many problems involving capitalization for which an analysis in terms
of the creation or enhancement of an asset does'not seem particularly helpful. For example,
many cases deny a deduction under § 162 or § 212 for costs incurred in connection with the
sale of property. For a recent example, see Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 352
F. Supp. 1159 (W. D. Mo. 1972). Although the denial of a deduction in such cases is explained
by saying that the costs are "capital expenditures," these costs are quite different from those
that are 'called capital expenditures because they are considered the costs of earning future
years' income. The sale cases involve tax benefit problems rather than timing problems; the
benefits of the costs of a sale are realized in the period in which they are incurred, but the
costs are treated as offset to the sales proceeds so as to reduce capital gains or unrecognized
gains rather than ordinary income. See Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp.
373, 378 (Ct. Cl. 1960), where the court said: "Expenses necessarily incurred to realize a
capital gain reduce the amount of that gain and partake of the nature of the gain to which
they relate." Id., citing Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), a leading tax benefit
rule case. The problem of capitalizing the costs of organizing or reorganizing a corporation is
somewhat similar to that involved in the sale cases. Although the nondeductibility of such
costs as those of issuing stock can be explained by saying that the costs create or alter the
corporation's capital structure, an "intangible asset"—see, e.g., General Bancshares Corp. v.
Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1960—another explana-
tion may be that costs related to a corporation's acquisition of capital should be nondeductible
because the receipt of the capital is not taxable.
Cases involving the deductibility of litigation costs may raise tax benefit "capital expendi-
ture" problems like those discussed above. See, e.g., Judge Hays' dissenting opinion in
Commissioner v, Doering, 335 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1964). They may also involve difficult
problems of separating personal from business expenditures, a matter that is dealt with by
determining whether the origin of the claim involved in the lawsuit was "personal," See, e.g.,
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963), In Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687
(1966), the Court held that the costs of defending against criminal charges arising out of the
taxpayer's securities business were not capital expenditures because "Miley were incurred in
his defense against charges of past criminal conduct, not in the acquisition of a capital asset."
Id. at 690. But the costs of litigation that is part of the process of acquiring property or of
"defending or perfecting title or property" must be capitalized. Woodward v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 572 (1970); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-2(e), 1.212-1(k) (1973), For discussions of capital
expenditure problems relating to legal fees, see generally Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the
Income Tax, 12 Tax L. Rev. 241, 250-63 (1957); Note, The Deductibility of Attorneys' Fees,
74 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1409-21 (1961). The results of the litigation cases do not, for the most
part, turn upon whether the subject of the litigation was an "asset," and to the extent that
such an inquiry may be relevant, as in Tellier, the litigation cases do not seem to present any
problems different in kind from cases not involving litigation.
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I. CODE PROVISIONS CONCERNING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
Section 263(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
that no deduction shall be allowed for amounts "paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to
increase the value of any property or estate: 121 Sections 162 and 212
provide that the "ordinary and necessary expenses" of a trade or
business or for the production of income are deductible, and both
the word "ordinary"22 and the word "expenses" 23 can be interpreted
as denying a current deduction for capital expenditures. The Su-
preme Court's opinion in Lincoln Savings & Loan may be read as
supporting both these explanations; the Court described the pay-
ments there as "capital in nature and not an expense, let alone an
ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) . . . "24 The only
apparent function of section 263 in the statutory scheme is to pro-
vide a heading under which the tax services can list the capital
expenditure cases. That section is both too narrow and too broad to
explain satisfactorily all capitalization requirements—too narrow
because its reference to "new buildings or . .. permanent improve-
ments" suggests that capitalization is limited to the costs of new,
tangible property, which is clearly not the case; too broad because
there are costs, such as those for some repairs, which are rep-
resented by permanent improvements but which have always been
considered deductible. 25 Sections 162 and 212 have no application to
expenses not incurred in carrying on a trade or business or for the
production of income, but such expenses must sometimes be
classified as capital or current, in order to determine the basis of
nonbusiness property. The Supreme Court has said that sections 263
and 162 are not all-inclusive, and that there are capital expenditures
not listed in section 263, without identifying whatever other sections
are relevant. 26 The Tax Court has said that costs not described in
section 263 may be subject to capitalization on the ground that they
are "acquisition" costs and thus part of the basis of property under
21 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 263(a)(1). This language has remained virtually unchanged
since the Revenue Act of 1913. Section 263(a)(2) requires capitalization-of amounts paid to
restore property or to make good the exhaustion of property for which a depreciation,
amortization or depletion deduction has been taken.
All section references in this article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless
otherwise indicated.
22
 See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); Griswold, An Argument
Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legisla-
tive Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142, 1145 (1943).
23 See 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation 349
(1972).
24
 403 U.S. at 354.
25 See text at notes 62-63 infra.
25 See Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 358 (1971).
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section 1012. 27 Recent cases treating capitalization as a problem of
determining whether the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly
reflects income bring sections 446 and 461 into the picture. 28 To the
extent that capitalized costs are associated with property having a
limited useful life, sections 1012, 1016(a), 167 and 612 provide for
their recovery through depreciation, amortization or depletion. 29
Capitalization of particular items ranging from almond grove
development costs to water conservation expenditures is governed
by a multitude of code provisions. 30 Of these specific provisions,
37 George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688, 698 (1968), affd per curiam, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir.
1970).
78
 See, e.g., text at notes 37-51 infra.
" When a capital expenditure is associated with more than one asset, a choice of which
property is to have its basis increased or an allocation of the expenditure between the
properties must be made. In Stuart M. Hughes, 54 T.C. 1049 (1970), aff'd, 450 F.2d 980 (4th
Cir. 1971), the Tax Court was faced with determining whether the cost of moving a house
from one lot to another should have been added to the basis of the house or to the basis of the
lot from which the house had been removed. The court upheld the Commissioner's allocation
of the entire moving cost to the house because the taxpayer failed to prove that more than
removal of the house from the lot was necessary to effect the sale or exchange of the lot or to
demonstrate the relationship between the cost of moving the house to its new location and the
cost of merely removing the house from the lot. The cost of moving a building from one lot to
another has been held to be an added cost of the building, while the cost of removing a
building from a lot has been held to increase the basis of the lot. See id. at 1056. The Hughes
court apparently would have allocated to the lot so much of the cost of moving the house as
did not exceed the cost of clearing the lot so that it could have been exchanged if the record
had provided a basis for making such an alloCation. See id. at 1057.
In Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v, United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973), the
taxpayer sought to amortize the costs of acquiring leasehold interests in land it owned over the
unexpired term of the leases, while the Government argued that the costs should be added to
the basis of the land and not amortized. The court ruled that the costs were "most closely
related" to the construction of a new building on the land and allowed amortization over the
useful life of the building.
" Section 263(b) denies a deduction for expenditures for advertising or promotion of
goodwill if a corporation has elected to treat those expenditures as capital improvements for
purposes of determining its excess profits tax credit. Section 263(c) permits a taxpayer to elect
to deduct intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells. Section
263(e) permits a taxpayer to elect to expense the costs of rehabilitating certain railroad rolling
stock if such rehabilitation expenditures in any given year do not exceed 20% of the basis of
the property. Section 263(1), discussed in text at notes 72-74 infra, provides that the Secretary
may by regulation permit taxpayers to elect to expense repairs and improvements to depre-
ciable property to the extent of a prescribed "repair allowance." Section 173 provides for the
deduction of expenditures to "establish, maintain, or increase" the circulation of a periodical
unless the taxpayer elects to capitalize so much of such costs as are chargeable to capital
account pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.173-1(c) (1973) .. The election does not apply to the costs of
acquiring circulation through the purchase of any part of the business of another publisher.
This exception appears to be an application of the principle that the purchase price of an asset
is generally not deductible although the cost of developing a similar asset may be. In Triangle
Publications, Inc., 54 T.C. 138 (1970), acquiesced in, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 3, the Tax Court
held that § 173 may apply to purchased circulation lists and to the purchase of the business of
a company that is a mere "distributor" rather than a "creator," a very questionable interpreta-
tion of the statute. Section 174(a) permits a taxpayer to expense research or experimental
expenditures in connection with a trade or business. Farmers may elect under §§ 175, 180 and
182 to expense certain costs of soil and water conservation, fertilizer and clearing land.
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section 266, which permits a taxpayer to elect to capitalize certain
taxes and carrying charges, is of particular interest, since the provi-
sion in the regulations under that section granting permission to
capitalize items "otherwise deductible" that are "under sound ac-
counting principles, chargeable to capital account," 31 shows that the
rules concerning capitalization, pervasive though they may be, allow
some items that should be capitalized to be expensed. 32
Recognition that capitalization is a basic principle of income
taxation rather than a technical requirement imposed by specific
statutory language may help to avoid the error of looking for the
answers to close questions concerning capitalization in the words of
the Code. Undue attention to the language of section 263 has led at
least one court to permit expensing of an item that clearly should
have been capitalized. In Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 33
 the
Section 249 requires corporations to capitalize premiums paid on repurchase of convertible
debt instruments to the extent the premiums are attributable to the conversion feature rather
than to the cost of borrowing. Section 250 permits deduction of payments by railroads to the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation if the railroad does not receive stock in connection
with the payment. Section 266 permits a taxpayer to elect to capitalize taxes and carrying
charges specified in the Regulations. Section 268 denies a deduction for the casts of unhar-
vested crops sold by the taxpayer. Section 272 limits the deductibility of the costs of disposal
'of coal or iron ore under the circumstances described in § 631(c). Section 278 requires
capitalization of certain costs of planting and developing citrus and almond groves. Section
616 provides for the deduction of the costs of developing a mine except to the extent the
taxpayer elects otherwise. Section 617 permits a taxpayer to elect to deduct certain costs of
exploring for minerals other than oil and gas. Section 1253(d) governs capitalization of
amounts paid for franchises, trademarks and trade names.
Closely related to the provisions permitting the deduction of costs that would normally
have to be capitalized are the provisions for recovery through depreciation or amortization of
costs over a shorter period than would normally be the case, such as § 169 (cost of pollution
control ficilities), § 174(b) (research and experimental expenditures), § 177 (trademark and
trade name expenditures), § 184 (railroad rolling stock), § 185 (railroad grading and tunnel
bores), § 187 (coal mine safety equipment), § 188 (on-the-job training and child care facilities),
§ 248 (corporate organizational expenditures) and § 1253(d) (franchises).
31
 Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b)(1)(iv) (1973).
12 Compare the Administration's proposal for a "Limitation on Artificial Accounting
Losses" ("LAL"), which would in certain cases involving "tax shelters" defer deduction of
certain items until the years in which income related to those items is realized. Since the
function of tax accounting is primarily the determination of the proper year for reporting
income and deductions, the very existence of losses that are "artificial" and that are attribut-
able to accounting rules demonstrates that something is wrong with those rules. The
Administration's general explanation of the proposed Limitation on Artificial Accounting
Losses states that tax shelter devices "take advantage of basic tax accounting rules as well as
intended tax incentives which contemplate some deferral of tax . . . ." CCH 1973 Stand. Fed.
Tax Rep. No, 24 (pt. II), at 95 (May 2, 1973). For a criticism of § 1251, a recapture provision
that is somewhat similar to the proposed LAL provisions in that it deals with items that
should be capitalized not by requiring capitalization but by establishing a special account for
the improper deductions, see Bittker, Objectives and Approaches to Tax Reform and
Simplification, in Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means (pt. I), 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 122, 127-28 (1973).
11
 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3270 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1973).
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Ninth Circuit held that depreciation on equipment used to construct
assets for use in the taxpayer's business did not have to be
capitalized as part of the cost of those assets. The court reasoned
that depreciation is not "paid out" within the meaning of section
263(a)(1). As an interpretation of the phrase "paid out" the Idaho
Power decision is highly questionable, since depreciation deductions
are, as a general rule, deductions for money spent by the taxpayer
for the depreciable property, delayed until the proper period by the
mechanics of the capitalization and depreciation provisions, 34 and so
represent amounts that are no less "paid out" than any other busi-
ness expense. 35 But the Idaho Power court erred not only in its
interpretation of the statute but also in its assumption that the
wording of section 263(a) was controlling. The capital expenditure
requirement is broader than any one Code section. 36
31 See Announcement 71-76, 197i Int. Rev. Bull. No. 1971-34, at 29: "The depreciation
deduction is allowed in order that taxpayers may treat as an expense in determining taxable
income an allocable part of the costs of business assets which have a limited life."
35 There is some authority, however, for the view that depreciation is not "paid" for
purposes of the medical expense and charitable contribution deductions. See Orr v. United
States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965); Clinton H. Mitchell, 42 T.C. 953 (1964); Maurice S.
Gordon, 37 T.C. 986 (1962); Weary v, United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas, 11 9646 (D. Kan.
July 16, 1973); Rev. Proc. 70-24, 1970-2 Cum, Bull. 505; Rev. Rul. 58-279, 1958-1 Cum.
Bull. 145. The argument of the taxpayer in Orr that the requirement of payment in 170 was
intended to affect timing of a deduction rather than the amount of the deduction seems sound.
36 Another reason given for allowing the deduction in Idaho Power was that depreciation
is allowable in order to permit the taxpayer to accumulate a reserve for replacement of the
equipment that is depreciating. But the deduction for depreciation is not ultimately a deduc-
tion "for" a reserve or even "for" wear and tear; it is a deduction "for" the money that has
been spent to acquire the asset being depreciated. As Judge Davis, dissenting in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. United States, 455 F.2d 993, 1023 (Ct, Cl. 1972), observed:
"Depreciation reflects the cost of an existing capital asset, not the cost of a potential replace-
ment." Id, at 1025 (dissenting opinion). The Supreme Court endorsed Judge Davis' reasoning
in reversing this case, thus authoritatively laying to rest the "reserve" theory of depreciation in
tax cases, See 412 U.S. 401, 415 (1973). Even under the "reserve" theory of depreciation,
Idaho Power is wrong, since the reserve the taxpayer needs to replace assets used in his
business would be adequately provided for by depreciation of the cost of the transmission and
distribution facilities constructed with the equipment. It is these assets, not the construction
equipment, that the taxpayer needs to replace to continue his business. Had the taxpayer in
Idaho Power purchased its transmission and distribution facilities, their entire cost would
have been capitalized, and there is no sound reason for requiring capitalization of less than
that cost merely because the taxpayer chose to construct the facilities rather than to buy them
intact. The Court of Claims and the Tax Court have required capitalization of depreciation on
equipment used in constructing capital assets. Southern Natural Gas Co. v, United States,
412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Idaho Power Co., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1970), rev'd, 477
F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L, W. 3270 (U,S. Nov. 5, 1973), Great Northern
Ry., 30 B.T.A. 691 (1934), which reached a contrary result, should no longer be regarded as
authoritative. That case proceeded upon the theory that the deduction should be allowed
because the depreciable equipment was used in the taxpayer's trade or business, an approach
to capitalization that would seem to permit expensing of all the costs of capital assets so long
as the taxpayer's business included constructing such assets. There is no apparent reason for
trying to solve capitalization problems by determining the scope of the taxpayer's trade or
business.
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IL CAPITALIZATION AS A "METHOD OF ACCOUNTING":
DEDUCTIBLE COSTS THAT PRODUCE ASSETS
The nondeductibility of the cost of an asset can be explained as
a reflection of the requirement that a taxpayer account for income
and deductions in a manner that clearly reflects his income. In many
cases a current deduction for the cost of an asset would distort
income because that cost should be matched with the income of the
years in which the asset is used in the taxpayer's business. But there
are instances in which even the costs of assets are deductible,
provided the distortion in income as a result of the deduction is not
serious. In effect, a determination of whether capitalization of an
expenditure is necessary to clearly reflect income is substituted for
the usual process of determining whether the expenditure produces
an asset. One example is the purchase of small items, where the
Court of Claims has expressly recognized the test of whether a
deduction clearly reflects income as a substitute for the Lincoln
Savings .& Loan inquiry of whether the expenditure produces or
enhances an asset. Another is the deductibility of the cost of repairs,
though the inconsistency of the repairs deduction with the require-
ment that the costs of assets be capitalized has not been generally
recognized. The legitimacy of the inquiry into clear reflection of
income in these cases is based upon treatment of capitalization as a
problem of determining the proper method of accounting for particu-
lar items.
The provisions in the regulations under section 446 defining
"change in the method of accounting" in a way that includes a
change in a practice of expensing the costs of a class of items 37 do
not necessarily mean that capitalization questions are to be decided
by considering, in a given case, whether capitalization is necessary
in order to clearly reflect income, 38 or whether it will permit deduc-
37
 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(a) (1973) defines "change in the method of accounting" to
include a "change in the treatment of any material item." 'Material item" is defined as "any
item which involves the proper time for the inclusion of the item in income or the taking of a
deduction." Id. Although some changes involving timing, such as adjustments to the useful
lives of depreciable assets, are not treated as accounting method changes on the ground that
such changes have "traditionally" been dealt with by adjustments in the year of change and
future years, a change from consistent treatment of the cost of a class of assets as an expense
to Capitalization is said in Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(b) (1973) to be a change in the method
of accounting.
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (1973), which requires a taxpayer to classify expenditures
between capital and expense, is a record-keeping requirement, not a rule requiring determina-
tion of capitalization questions as matters of clear reflection of income.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.461-1(a)(1), -1(a)(2) (1973), providing that expenditures that "[result] in
the creation of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the
taxable year" are not deductible, are at best neutral on this point.
33
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(b).
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lions to be taken in the "proper taxable year." 39 Treatment of
capitalization changes as accounting method changes to determine
whether the Commissioner's consent to a change in practice is
required" or whether errors for years barred by the statute of
limitations are to be corrected by adjustments under section 481
rather than through the mitigation provisions of sections 1311-14 4 '
does not require resort to the general accounting method principles
of sections 446 and 461 for all purposes if other Code provisions
answer timing questions specifically. There are many situations
where timing problems are dealt with specifically and exclusively by
rules other than those of the accounting sections." It is at least
arguable, that a capitalization practice is not a "method of account-
ing" when the issue is whether ; a particular item should be
capitalized, even though the practice is a "method of accounting"
when the issue involves the conseqUences of a change in the prac-
tice. Or it can be said that even thoUgh capitalization is a method of
accounting, the general search for a clear definition of income must
be conducted within the limits of section 263 and section 162 or
212. 43 What little authority there is on this question, however,
supports the direct use of sections 446 and 461 in dealing with
capitalization questions, at least in cases where an expenditure does
produce an asset.
In Fort Howard Paper Co." the taxpayer contended that its
practice of allocating only direct costs to self-constructed assets was
permissible because the method clearly reflected income and had
been followed consistently for thirty-five years. The Tax Court
rejected the Commissioner's contention that section 263 was "in and
of itself diapositive of the issue,"45 and, finding sections 263 and 446
"inextricably intertwined" and being unwilling to "encase the gen-
eral provisions of section 263 with an inflexibility and sterility
neither mandated to carry out the intent of Congress nor required
for the effective discharge of respondent's revenue-collecting
39 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 461(a).
413
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(e).
41 'See Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1972); Rev.
Rul. 64-74, 1964-1 Cum, Bull. pt. 1, at 314; Liles, Adjustments Dictated by Treasury.
Requirements: Statutory Relief Provisions; Correlative Adjustments; Effect of Adjustments on
Future Years, N.Y.U. 26th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 595, 601 (1968).
42
 For example, § 214 in effect puts taxpayers on an accrual basis with a one-month
accounting period for purposes of determining the monthly limitation on the dependency care
deduction. Bittker, supra note 32, at 119. No one would contend that such specific rules as
these can be overridden by the general language of §§ 446 and 461.
43
 Both of these arguments were advanced without success by the Government in
Cincinnati, N,O. & Tex. Pat. Ry, v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970),
44 49 T.C. 275 (1967).
43
 Id. at 283.	 1
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responsibilities ,"46 treated the problem as one arising under section
446 and held that, under the particular circumstances of the case,
the taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflected its income.'"
The use of clear reflection of income principles in a case like
Fort Howard is not necessarily inconsistent with viewing capitaliza-
tion as a fixed requirement of section 263, since the issue in Fort
Howard was one of what costs were to be allocated to what was
clearly a capital asset, a problem not expressly covered by section
263, which, as the court observed, "begs the question"" by requir-
ing capitalization of amounts paid out "for" new buildings or im-
provements. But in Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. v.
United States" the Court of Claims, faced with a clear choice
between deciding a capitalization case under section 263 or under
section 446, chose the latter. The taxpayer, whose financial state-
ments were prepared, in compliance with the Interstate Commerce
Commission's "General Instructions of Accounting Classifications,"
followed the ICC's' "minimum rule" of expensing all purchases of
property costing less than $500 other than land, track and railroad
cars. 50
 The Commissioner disallowed expense deductions for items
46
 Id. at 283-84. 	 •
47 The result of Fort Howard may be attributable to some extent to the strong equities
favoring the taxpayer, whose returns had been audited every year for 33 years without
challenge to its accounting practice, and whose method of allocating costs had frequently been
used by the examining agents themselves in computing allowable deductions. The Internal
Revenue Service changed its position as a result of investigating alleged "irregularities" in the
conduct of one of the revenue agents who had examined the taxpayer's returns. The investiga-
tion disclosed that no "irregularities" had in fact occurred, but the investigating agent
proposed that the taxpayer's method of allocating costs to self-constructed assets be chal-
lenged. Id. at 279-80. The court's opinion carefully limits its holding to the particular facts of
the case, including the application of the taxpayer's allocation method by the Commissioner in
making adjustments to the taxpayer's income, "as distinguished from . . . mere failure to
object to its use by such taxpayer." Id. at 286. Several cases citing Fort Howard have, in the
manner of the devil quoting scripture, adopted its reasoning while reaching results that are
inconsistent with Fort Howard unless one is willing to accept rather tenuous distinctions. See
Lincoln Elec. Co., 54 T.C. 926 (1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1971); All-Steel Equip.,
Inc., 54 T.C. 1749 (1970), rev'd in part on other grounds, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1I 9660 (7th Cir.
1972); cf. Electric & Neon, Inc., 56 T.C. 1324 (1971); Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 28
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 635 (1969). .;
The taxpayer in William K. Coors, 60 T.C. No. 44 (June 12, 1973), argued that Fort
HoWard authorized its practice of expensing or allocating to costs of goods sold certain indirect
costs of constructing capital assets. The Tax Court distinguished Fort Howard on the basis of
its finding in that case that the taxpayer's capital assets were constructed by employees in their
spare time, so that the construction did not interfere with the employees' maintenance tasks,
and the contribution of- the employees to the costs of the assets was in effect zero, since no
costs (other than direct costs) were incurred beyond those that would have been incurred had
no construction taken place.
4° .49 T.C. at 283.
49
 424 F.2d, 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
3° The "minimum rule" also prohibited combining unrelated items to circumvent the
requirement that small items be expensed, and dividing up large purchases to avoid capitali-
zation. Id. at 56566.
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costing more than $100 each. In upholding the taxpayer's practice,
the court rejected the government's argument that the predecessor of
section 263 was solely determinative, calling this "an argument for
an inflexible objective, ipso facto approach" to capitalization. 5 ' Cit-
ing Fort Howard for the proposition that the accounting sections are
"inextricably intertwined" with section 263, the court treated the
question as one of clear reflection of income, and allowed a deduc-
tion for the cost of the "minimum rule" items. Cincinnati Ry. is thus
one example of a case in which a cost that produces an asset is
nevertheless deductible.
The problem of whether expensing small items distorts income
may be approached either by considering whether the practice will,
for taxpayers in general, be likely to distort income, or by consider-
ing whether the practice has, in the case of the particular taxpayer
involved, distorted income. The Cincinnati Ry. opinion adopts both
of these approaches to some extent. The court's finding that the
"minimum rule" was acceptable to accountants and to the Interstate
Commerce Commission 52 implies that the practice is acceptable per
se. The court went on, however, to consider the amount of distor-
tion involved for the particular taxpayer, a problem that involves
two distinct views of the meaning of "clear reflection of income."
If one looks to a single purchase of a capital asset it is clear that
expensing the purchase price distorts income to some extent, since
the cost of an asset that will produce income for several years will be
deducted only in the year of purchase. If, however, the taxpayer has
a number of capital assets, which he replaces regularly, expensing
the purchase price of those assets may lead to approximately the
same deductions as capitalization and depreciation. Thus a taxpayer
whose business requires the use of ten widgets, each costing $100
and having a useful life of five years, would, if he capitalized the
purchase price of the widgets, take depreciation of $200 per year. 53
This is the same amount as the purchase price of two widgets, the
number that would, on the average, have to be replaced each year.
In this example, expensing the purchase price of the widgets leads to
the same deduction as capitalization, so long as the number and cost
of the widgets remains constant (a somewhat unrealistic assumption
for an expanding business in an inflationary period).
Another approach to determining whether income is seriously
distorted by expensing the cost of small items involves comparing
the amount of the excess deduction obtained by expensing the item
with the total amount of income involved. Thus a taxpayer who
51
 Id. at 567.
52 Id. at 569-70.
33
 This figure represents straight-line depreciation and assumes no salvage value.
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uses one widget of the kind described above and expenses its cost
win have his income reduced by $100 in the year a widget is
purchased and increased by $20 in each of the five years in which
the widget is used. This is a distortion, but if the taxpayer's annual
income is one million dollars, the distortion is not a very serious
matter.
The Court of Claims' approach to the "clear reflection of in-
come" problem in Cincinnati Ry. adopts both of the aforementioned
views of the meaning of that phrase. The court found it "significant
that, both on a year-to-year basis and on a 17-year overall basis,"
the expenses deductible under the "minimum rule" were "fairly
similar" to the depreciation that would have been taken if the costs
in question had been capitalized. 54 The comparison on a seventeen-
year basis is not very meaningful, since it establishes only that
depreciation over a substantial period of time will approach the cost
of the assets being depreciated, a point that does not require proof
by statistical comparisons." The year-by-year similarity between
depreciation and minimum rule expenses shows that the income
figure produced under the minimum rule is close to the "true"
income figure. The court went on to compare the expenses in ques-
tion with the taxpayer's yearly operating expenses, its net income
and its total investment, and, finding that the minimum rule ex-
penses were relatively small and that the Commissioner's computa-
tions would have increased the taxpayer's income by a relatively
small amount, allowed the deductions. This kind of comparison,
unlike the comparison between the minimum rule expenses.and the
depreciation that would have been taken if minimum rule items had
been capitalized, does not tend to show that the minimum rule
produces no distortion in income, but rather shows that the distor-
tion is small in relation to the total income involved. That is to say,
a method of accounting is acceptable for tax purposes even though it
distorts income, if the distortion is small in relation to the total
amount of income.
The holding of Cincinnati Ry. is consistent with the regulatory
provisions and administrative practices permitting deduction of the
costs of small items of property which, strictly speaking, should be
capitalized because the property has a useful life beyond the taxable
year. 56
 Thus farmers may deduct the cost of small tools, 57 profes-
sional persons may deduct the cost of "books, furniture, and profes-
5° 424 F.2d at 571.
55
 The assets in question were assumed to have a useful life of about ten years.
56
 Indeed, the Internal Revenue Service had, in auditing the returns of the taxpayer in
Cincinnati Ry., allowed the deduction of purchases of less than $100, the limit of the ICC's
minimum rule until 1940. 424 F.2d at 572.
57
 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1973).
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sional instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is
short,"58 and those who have to wear uniforms may deduct their
cost." In none of these cases will a current deduction reflect income
more clearly than would capitalization and depreciation, but the
burden on the taxpayer of accounting for such costs through
capitalization and depreciation would not justify the small increase
in the accuracy of determining taxable income that would result
from capitalization. 6° Cincinnati Ry. differs from the above situa-
tions only in that the determination that the inconvenience of requir-
ing capitalization outweighs the accuracy in computing income is
made by looking directly at the amount of the expense rather than
by considering the nature of the assets purchased. The only serious
problem with the Cincinnati Ry. rule may be in establishing its
boundaries. A de minimis rule that can be applied only by a tax-
payer who can support the practice by the preparation of a statisti-
cal analysis and the expert testimony of accountants is not likely to
achieve convenience for either the taxpayer or the Internal Revenue
Service. The Cincinnati Ry. opinion relies to such a great extent on
the particular facts of that case that the case may not even hold that
all taxpayers subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission's
minimum rule may use that rule for tax purposes, and the case is
certainly not authority for the expensing of costs of less than $500 by
taxpayers who are not required to do so by a regulatory agency. The
Court of Claims' suggestion that the Treasury adopt by regulation
minimum rules for classes of taxpayers whose circumstances war-
rant such treatment6 ' seems sound.
It is useful to consider the problem of distinguishing deductible
repairs from nondeductible "improvements" in light of the Cincin-
nati Ry. approach to clear reflection of income. There have been
hundreds of cases involving the "repairs vs. improvements" puzzle,
but for the purposes of this discussion it is necessary to consider only
one example. The cost of replacing a roof is a capital expenditure,
while the cost of replacing a shingle is a repair. 62 This distinction is
58 Treas. Reg.	 1.162-6 (1973).
59 Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 Cum, Bull. 35.
" "Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each item of property
separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of income is nil or minimal, the Code is not
so rigid and so impracticable that it demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for
individually, no matter what the trouble or the onus." Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pax, Ry, v.
United States, 424 F,2d 563, 572 (Ct. CI. 1970).
" Id. The American Law Institute, in ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X166(b)(2) (Feb.
1954 Draft), provides for an election to expense "Wyly aggregate expenditure the amount of
which is $500 or less."
fit The example is taken from Shugerman, Basic Criteria for Distinnguishing Revenue
Charges from Capital Expenditures in Income Tax Computations, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 231
(1950).
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not attributable to any difference in kind between what is produced
by the two kinds of expenditure. No distinction can be made by
looking to the creation or enhancement of an asset, since the repair
both produces one (the shingle) and enhances one (the roof). 63 Nor
can a distinction be found by focusing upon the function of capitali-
zation as a mechanism for deferral of costs that are properly consid-
ered to contribute to earning income in future years, since repairs
and even maintenance are essential to preserving the asset involved
so that it can earn that income. The only meaningful differences
between the deductible repair and the nondeductible improvement
are that the repair involves a small amount of money and is the kind
of cost that will have to be repeated frequently, while the improve-
ment involves a large amount of money and is not likely to be
repeated on a more or less annual basis. Of these distinctions, the
one involving the amount of the expenditure is perhaps' the more
significant; virtually no authority has been found allowing the ex-
pensing of the costs of what are normally considered improvements
rather than repairs on the •ground that improvements are made
regularly. 64 Repairs, then, are deductible for the same reason the
minimum rule expenses in Cincinnati Ry. were deductible: they
involve relatively small amounts of money.
The regulations concerning repairs provide that "[t]he cost of
incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value of the
property nor appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinarily
efficient operating condition" is deductible. 65 This language may be
consistent with the view that repairs are deductible because they are
inexpensive, if one focuses on the words "materially" and "appreci-
ably."'The regulations, however,.emphasize the result of the repair
6] The view of capital expenditures as costs that produce an asset might suggest a
distinction between maintenance and improvements, on the ground that maintenance does not
produce anything new. But the line between deductibility and nondeductibility has always
been drawn so as to allow a deduction for the cost of repairs.
64
 But cf. Great Northern Ry., 30 B.T.A. 691 (1934).
65
 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1973). In Illinois Merchant Trust Co., 4 B.T.A. 103, 106,
acquiesced in, V-2 Cum, Bull. 2 (1926), the following language was used to distinguish repairs
from "replacements":
In determining whether an expenditure is a capital one or is chargeable against
operating income, it is necessary to bear in mind the purpose for which the expendi-
ture is made. To repair is to restore to a sound state or to mend, while a replacement
connotes a substitution. A repair is an expenditure for the purpose of keeping the
property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. It does not add to the value of
the property, nor does it appreciably prolong its life. It merely keeps the property in
an operating condition over its probable useful life for the uses for which it was
acquired. Expenditures for that purpose are distinguishable from those for replace-
ments, alterations, improvements or additions which prolong the life of the property,
increase its value, or make it adaptable to a different use. The one is a maintenance
charge, while the others are additions to capital investment which should not be
applied against current earnings.
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or improvement rather than the amount of the expense. While some
correlation between the two may be expected, it is not inevitable
that an expensive undertaking will result in a significant increase in
the value of the asset involved. One troublesome problem in the
repair-improvement area is that of the major effort to achieve a
minor result. For example, in Oberman Manufacturing Co. 66 the
taxpayer had to remove a roof in order to replace an expansion joint
and stop the roof from leaking. The Tax Court, finding that the
work did not add materially to the value of the building, allowed the
deduction. If the true distinction between repairs and improvements
rests on the amount and the routine nature of the expenditure,
Oberman Manufacturing Co. and similar cases67 are wrong. A
number of cases require capitalization of Oberman -type expenditures
if the improvement adds a new and distinct asset to the building 68 or
adapts the building to a new use. 69 It is not self-evident that this is a
sensible distinction, though it is found throughout the capitalization
area." The ultimate issue is whether deferral of a deduction is
" 47 T.C. 471 (1967), acquiesced in, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 3.
E.g., United States v. Wehrli, 400 F,2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (Government not entitled
to directed verdict that 597,000 of work done on a building must be capitalized);
Plainfield-Union Water Co., 39 T.C. 333 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1964-2 Cum. Bull, 8;
Regenstein v. Edwards, 121 F. Supp. 952 (M.D. Ga. 1954); Kansas City S. Ry. v. United
States, 112 F. Supp. 164 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Midland Empire Packing Co., 14 T.C. 635 (1950),
acquiesced in, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 3; American Bemberg Corp., 10 T.C. 361 (1948), nonac-
quiesced in, 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 5, affd mem., 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul. 54-356,
1954-2 Cum. Bull. 82.
68 E.g., Woo!rich Woolen Mills v, United States, 289 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1961) (cost of
constructing a filtering plant; irrelevant that the plant does not help the taxpayer produce
anything); Hotel Sulgrave, Inc., 21 T.C. 619 (1954) (cost of sprinkler system installed in hotel);
Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 550 (1954) (cost of construct-
ing a fire passageway in a theater; taxpayer argued that the expenditure decreased the value of
the theater).
E.g., Coors Porcelain Co., 52 'C.C. 682 (1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1970);
Difco Laboratories, Inc,, 10 T.C. 660 (1948), acquiesced in, 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 1; Rev. Rul.
71-469, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 120 (cost of converting utility's customers' steam heating equip-
ment to gas equipment held capital, although change did not increase the number of utility's
customers).
7° Thus Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), which held that voluntary payment by
an officer of a bankrupt corporation of the corporation's debts in order to "solidify his credit
and standing" was not "ordinary," has been distinguished by a number of lower courts, which
have allowed a deduction for similar payments upon a finding that the payments were made
to protect rather than enhance the taxpayer's existing business or reputation. See, e.g., Allen
v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1960); Lutz v. Commissioner, 282 F,2d 614 (5th Cir.
1960); Dunn & McCarthy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1943); Scruggs-
Vandervoort-Barney, Inc., 7 'C.C. 779 (1946); Edward J. Miller, 37 B.T.A. 830 (1938). Judge
Raum's opinion in Carl Reimers Co., Inc., 19 T.C. 1235 (1953), affd, 211 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.
1954), may be read as suggesting that the distinction between these cases and Welch is
unsound.
Similarly, until the enactment of the predecessor of § 173, the deductibility of payments
relating to the circulation of a publication turned upon whether the payments were made to
maintain existing circulation or to increase circulation. Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co.,
103 F,2d 947 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 577 (1939); Perkins Bros. Co. v. Commis-
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desirable as a matter of matching income with deductions. Whether
a construction-type expense enables a taxpayer to earn future in-
come in a new and different way rather than in the same way he has
been earning income in the past seems irrelevant.'" The distinction
may stem from the use of the term "improvements," which has
connotations of something new and different, to describe the costs
that must be capitalized.
An approach somewhat similar to the "minimum rule" has been
authorized by statute in the case of repairs. Section 263(f) authorizes
regulations to permit a taxpayer to elect to deduct amounts paid for
repairs, rehabilitation or improvements for a class of property to the
extent such amounts do not exceed a "repair allowance" for that
class." The legislative history of section 263(f) indicates that costs
that are "clearly of a capital nature" must be capitalized notwith-
standing an election to use the repair allowance," a rule that creates
two categories of capital expenditures, "improvements," which have
always been considered capital expenditures but which now may be
expensed within the limits of the repair allowance, and "clearly
capital" expenditures, which must be capitalized in any case. Some
capital expenditures are thus more capital than others, though the
distinction between the two classes is not readily apparent. Because
the use of section 263(f) is elective, that provision's stated objective
sioner, 78 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1935); Public Opinion Publishing Co. v. Jensen, 76 F.2d 494 (8th
Cir. 1935); Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
290.U.S. 646 (1933); News Publishing Co. v. Blair, 29 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Journal of
Living Publishing Corp., 3 T.C. 1058 (1944); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 26 B.T.A. 107
(1932); Walter S. Dickey, 14 B.T.A. 1295 (1929), acquiesced in, IX-1 Cum. Bull. 15 (1930).
Compare the regulations concerning the deductibility of educational expenditures ("an
inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures"), which allow a deduction for the
costs of maintaining or improving skills required in an existing trade or business of the
taxpayer, but not for the cost of qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or business. Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-5 (1973).
The search for "newness" may derive in part from the unfortunate tendency to confuse
the question whether an expenditure is a capital expenditure with the question whether an
expenditure is incurred in carrying on a trade or business. See text at notes 174-82 infra.
21 Some support can be found for requiring capitalization of only those costs that increase
the taxpayer's earning capacity. See, e.g., Marsh Fork Coal Co. v. Lucas, 42 F.2d 83 (4th
Cir. 1930), and the excellent discussion of that case in Note, Income Tax Accounting:
Business Expense or Capital Outlay, 47 nary. L. Rev. 669 (1934). Although the comments to
the capital expenditure provisions of the American Law Institute's Federal Income Tax
Statute indicate acceptance of the theory of the Marsh Fork case—see ALI Fed. Income Tax
Stat. § X166(b), comment 3 at 287-88 (Feb. 1954 Draft)—that principle is not uniformly
followed, nor should it be. See Note, supra, at 675-77.
. 72
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2) (1973). For a criticism of the Treasury's issuance of the
Asset Depreciation Range System, of which the repair allowance system is a part, without
specific statutory authority, see Bittker, Treasury Authority to Issue the Proposed "Asset
Depreciation Range System" Regulations, 49 Taxes 265 (1971). Repair allowances for some
classes of property have been'established by Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 8, at
13.
73 S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971).
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of resolving disputes is achieved only by conceding a class of close
cases to taxpayers, and no simplification in bookkeeping is likely to
result, since a taxpayer will have to , determine whether his expendi-
tures are repairs or improvements or "clearly capital" improvements
in order to determine whether election to use the repair allowance
system is desirable. The provision as it presently exists thus achieves
no readily apparent desirable goal, though a mandatory guideline
allowance for repairs could achieve considerable simplification, 74
and would be consistent with the policies underlying the deductibil-
ity of repairs.
Although no other case has gone so far as Cincinnati Ry. in
substituting a search for clear reflection of income for consideration
of whether an expenditure produces an "improvement or better-
ment," there is an evident tendency in the recent cases to discuss
capitalization questions in accounting method language. Thus, in
Electric & Neon, Inc.," the taxpayer defended its practice of cur-
rently deducting the cost of signs it built and leased on the ground
that its practice had been consistently followed and clearly reflected
income. The Tax Court met the clear reflection of income argument
directly and held for the Commissioner because the taxpayer's prac-
tice "demonstrably produced serious inaccuracies in the year-by-year
computation of income"7 ' and was contrary to industry practice and
to the method which the Accounting Principles Board had said was
generally used by lessors. 77 That the inquiry into whether the cost of
the signs had to be capitalized was one involving the choice of an
acceptable accounting method was not questioned. In Alabama
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.," the Commissioner conceded that requiring
the taxpayer to capitalize the cost of self-constructed signs effected a
change in accounting method, and the court's decision in favor of
the Commissioner was based on the necessity of capitalization in
order to reflect clearly the taxpayer's income. In Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. v. United States," a case involving the classification of
the costs of rehabilitation of a pipeline as repairs or improvements,
the Tenth Circuit seems to have accepted the taxpayer's contention
that requiring capitalization would amount to changing its method
of accounting, while upholding the Government's contention that
the change was required. And in William K. Coors," the Tax Court
74 See 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation 356
(1972) [hereinafter cited as S. Surrey].
75 56 T.C. 1324 (1971).
7" Id. at 1333.
77 Id.
79
 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 635 (1969).
79
 449 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
"° 60 T.C. No. 44 (June 12, 1973).
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treated the choice of a method of allocating overhead costs to self-
constructed assets as a problem of clear reflection of income.
That there is an increasing tendency to regard capitalization
questions as clear reflection of income problems seems evident.
Whether this trend is desirable depends upon the use the courts
make of the flexibility that the accounting method approach gives.
"Flexibility" is the sort of thing that sounds desirable, particularly if
the alternative is described as "sterile,"" "rigid," 82
 "ipso facto"83 or
"arbitrary."'" Still, the major part of the Internal Revenue Code
consists of specific rules that deny flexibility to the courts, suggesting
that Congress, at least, does not always consider flexibility a
virtue. 85
 The results of the capitalization cases discussed above are
acceptable, at least if Fort Howard is limited to its peculiar facts, as
the Tax Court's opinion suggests it will be. 86
 Attempts by taxpayers
to justify expensing a variety of capital expenditures on the ground
that they have always done so and thus are practicing the account-
ing virtue of "consistency" have been rejected; 87 "consistency," the
Tax Court has said, "is not a substitute for correctness." 88
 There are
some disturbing hints in the recent cases, however, of a tendency to
defer unduly to the opinions of accountants in capitalization cases.
AlthOugh the Supreme Court has pointed out that financial account-
ing rules are not necessarily applicable in tax cases, even when the
81
 See Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275, 283 (1967).
82
 See Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Cl.
1970).
83 See id. at 567.
84
 See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968).
85
 Much of this detail, of course, is a congressional response not to excessive flexibility on
the part of the courts, but rather to the failure of the courts to be flexible in applying the
provisions of earlier, less intricate statutes. Cf. Judge Simpson's concurring opinion in Inter-
national Trading Co., 57 T.C. 455, 463 (1971), rev'd, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9582 (7th Cir.
1973). The intricacies of the corporate reorganization provisions—§§ 306 and 341, and much
of the estate and gift tax provisions—illustrate the congressional approach. In other areas,
attempts at judicial flexibility have led to the enactment of inflexible Code provisions, even
where Congress has approved the basic thrust of the court's approach, as in the "CliffOrd
trust" provisions. See generally Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, U. So.
Cal. 1961 Tax Inst. 1; Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1960 S. Ct. Rev.
222.
86
 49 T.C. at 286-87.
B7
 See cases discussed in text at notes 75-80 supra.
88
 Electric & Neon, Inc., 56 T.C. 1324, 1333 (1971) (Simpson, J.). For financial account-
ing purposes, consistency may at times be at least as important as correctness, since it is
important that current financial data be comparable to earlier years' data so that users of the
data may be able to determine whether the company's position is improving, declining or
remaining the same. Therefore, at least in cases where it is questionable what the "best" rule
is, it may be better for a company to .apply an unsatisfactory rule consistently than to improve
the accuracy of current financial statements at the cost of making comparison between those
statements and earlier statements impossible. But there is no corresponding reason for failure
to correct errors for tax purposes in order to achieve consistency.
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rules are imposed upon a taxpayer by a regulatory agency, 89 the
courts in both Fort Howard and Cincinnati Ry. relied to a consider-
able extent upon the evidence of accounting texts and the expert
testimony of accountants. In Cincinnati Ry. the Court of Claims
brushed aside the Supreme Court's holdings in Schlude v.
Commissioner 9° and American Automobile Association v. United
States" that the taxpayers' accounting methods, though in accor-
dance with "generally accepted accounting principles," were unac-
ceptable for tax purposes, by saying that the rule of those cases is
applicable in "the limited context of the accounting for received but
unearned income." 92 It is true that the prepaid income cases like
Schlude and American Automobile Association involve problems
that suggest the need for a different accounting rule for tax purposes
than is proper for financial accounting purposes, 93 while no similar
need for separate approaches is apparent in the capitalization area."
But even where it is reasonable to use the same rules for financial
accounting purposes as for tax purposes it is neither necessary nor
desirable that the courts abdicate their responsibility for seeing to it
that the rules are sound by leaving the matter to the accountants.
For one thing, it is probably undesirable to expose the accountants
to the stresses of devising accounting rules with one eye on potential
tax savings for their clients. One may suspect that the pressures of
89 Old Colony RR. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
9° 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
91
 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
92 424 F.2d at 570.
It may be desirable that the income tax be imposed when the taxpayer has the money
to pay the tax, rather than in some later year when the money may have been spent. Cf. W.
Andrews, Federal Income Taxation 11 41.23(c) (1969), For a contrary view, see Nolan, The
Merit in Conformity of Tax to Financial Accounting, 50 Taxes 761, 768 (1972). The Regula-
tions now permit accrual basis taxpayers to report advance income from the sale of goods
when the income is considered earned for financial accounting purposes, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5
(1973), and advance income for services performed in the following year may be reported in
the year of performance, Rev. Proc. 71-21, - 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 549. Generally speaking, a tax
accounting rule that says that a taxpayer has not received income even though the transaction
in question has given him substantial amounts of money seems somewhat out of touch with
reality, just as the operation of the well-known real estate tax shelter, where depreciation on
mortgaged property places the taxpayer in the happy position of having both losses and cash,
is generally regarded as a loophole. Deferral of income until it is earned may be perfectly
reasonable as a matter of financial accounting, but it does not necessarily follow that the tax
accounting rule should be the same. The distinction between tax accounting and financial
accounting in prepaid income cases was recognized in Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026,
1032-33 (1955).
94
 The existence of the income tax provides considerable pressure for expensing as much
as possible, while non-tax considerations encourage Capitalization. If the income tax require-
ment of capitalization were tied to flexible financial accounting principles, the result would
undoubtedly be an increase in the tax burdens of taxpayers sensitive to pressures from
shareholders and creditors, and a decrease in the tax burden of those who have no great need
to present impressive financial statements.
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the income tax have occasionally led to the acceptance of accounting
rules having no obvious intrinsic merit, such as the LIFO method of
accounting for inventories." For the most part, the courts have
done reasonably well in the accounting area, a circumstance that
may explain the absence of detailed statutory rules concerning tim-
ing of income and deductions. While it is no doubt of some benefit to
consider what accountants have to say about capitalization, the
responsibility for devising the rules is, and should remain, upon the
courts.
One illustration of the unfortunate consequences of uncritical
acceptance of accounting theory is the. distinction that seems to be
developing between the rules for determining the cost of an asset
when the issue is capitalization and the rules for determining the
cost of an asset when that asset is an inventory item. It is well
established that the prime cost method, which does not take into
account overhead costs, is not acceptable for inventory accounting,
either for tax purposes or for financial accounting purposes. 96 But in
Fort Howard the Tax Court, in permitting the taxpayer to use a
capitalization method that allocated no part of overhead to self-
constructed capital assets, relied to a considerable extent on expert
accounting testimony - and accounting literature as establishing that
failure to allocate part of overhead to the asset in question may be
acceptable for assets other than inventory, though such a practice is
erroneous in the case of inventory. 97 Fort Howard may, well be
distinguishable from the cases prohibiting prime costing of inventory
(as well as from other capital expenditure cases) because of the
peculiar facts of that case, 98 but it is unsound to base the distinction
upon the asset's being inventory rather than something else, except
perhaps to the extent that the regulations expressly require alloca-
tion of some overhead-to inventory. In both cases the problem is the
determination of the cost of an asset, and in both cases the reason
for the importance of an accurate cost determination is that the cost
is to be given effect for tax purposes in a period later than that in
which it is incurred. There is no reason to apply different standards
merely because the method of deferral is inventory accounting on
the one hand and capitalization on the other. The apparent willing-
ness of accountants to accept the distinction does not justify the
courts' doing the same, particularly when the accountants have not
95 T. Fiflis & H. Kripke, Accounting for Business Lawyers 264 (1971).
96 See All-Steel Equip., Inc., .54 T.C. 1749 (1970), and authorities cited therein, id. at
1752-53.
97 49 T.C. at 285-86.
98 The Tax Court's finding in Fort Howard that the taxpayer's employees constructed
capital assets only in their spare time in effect makes the prime cost method the same as the
incremental cost method for that taxpayer. Id. at 283 n.4.
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expressly required the application of different rules but rather have
selected the proper practice for inventory accounting and have left
the question open for capitalization. 99
Since the accounting method provisions of the Code contain no
specific rules applicable to capitalization, but merely urge the selec-
tion of practices that will "clearly reflect income,".the importance of
the courts' acceptance of capitalization as an accounting problem is
more in the nature of the creation of attitudes.toward capitalization
than in any direct result that is required by the accounting method
approach. Even the "flexibility" that the Court of Claims and the
Tax Court have found to be a desirable consequence of treating
capitalization as an accounting problem has been approved in cases
approaching capitalization as a section 263 problem.'°° And there is
no inherent lack of logic in treating capitalization as a method of
accounting while limiting the application of capitalization to costs
that produce or enhance an asset.
All of the cases discussed above involve the deductibility of
expenditures that clearly produced assets. The converse of this situa-
tion, capitalization of costs that do not produce assets, has not yet
been dealt with as an accounting .method problem, though it is
conceivable that continued treatment of capitalization as an account-
ing problem may someday lead to the creation of a climate of
opinion in which the search for an asset in capitalization cases is
replaced by consideration of whether capitalization is necessary to
clearly reflect income. Another possibility, which will be examined
below, is that the determination of whether particular expenses
produce assets will, in close cases, turn upon clear reflection of
income considerations.
III. CONSTRUCTION PERIOD EXPENSES
An examination of the treatment of construction period insur-
ance and ground rent during construction may help to clarify the
99 Another distinction between costing for inventory purposes and costing for capitaliza-
tion purposes involves the treatment of storage charges for whiskey during the aging process.
In George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968), affd, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970), the Tax Court
required capitalization of such costs in the case of a taxpayer who purchased bulk whiskey as
an investment, while the Court of Claims, in Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. United States,
476 F.2d 1327 (Ct. Cl. 1973), and the Seventh Circuit, in Van Pickerill & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 445 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1971), have held that such charges may be deducted currently
where the whiskey was the taxpayer's inventory. Although the Seventh Circuit in Van
Pickerill found Schultz "readily distinguishable," id. at 921, the opinions suggest that the
"distinction" is attributable to the failure of . the Seventh Circuit and the Court of Claims to
accept the Tax Court's reasoning. Another consideration may be that the problem in the case
of a speculator like the taxpayer in Schultz has overtones of reduction of capital gain by the
taking of ordinary deductions, a factor that is not determinative, but which, as Judge
Tannenwald observed, may erect a yellow caution signal on [the] road to decision." 50 T,C.
at 694. These cases are discussed in text at notes 142-44 infra.
loo E.g., American Seating Co., 4 13.T.A. 649 (1926).
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relationship between the requirement that a cost be capitalized and
the contribution of that cost to the production or enhancement of an
asset. The "asset" requirement in capital expenditure cases has
previously been described as a requirement that the costs "of pro- ,
ducing" or "of enhancing" an asset be capitalized. But the cases
discussed in this section establish that at least some costs associated
with the construction of assets are capital expenditures even though
those costs do not in and of themselves produce or enhance any
asset. As a matter of clear reflection of income such costs as insur-
ance during construction and ground rent should be capitalized.
Capitalization of these costs is consistent with the asset theory of
capital expenditures so long as the relationship between costs and
assets necessary to support capitalization is broader than one of
cause and effect. The cases support the capitalization of construc-
tion period insurance, but ground rent during construction is, for no
apparent reason, deductible.
A. Insurance
A few cases have treated the capitalization of insurance during
construction as one aspect of the broader problem of selecting and
applying the proper overall cost accounting method of accounting
for self-constructed assets,"' but the usual approach has been to
determine whether a particular insurance cost was a capital expendi-
ture..Most of the authorities require capitalization of premiums for
both liability and indemnity insurance during construction, 102
151 SeeWriiiiam K. Coors, 60 T.C. No. 44 (June 12, 1973); Fort Howard Paper Co., 49
T.C. 275 (1967); Ben Perlmutter, 44 T.C. 382 (1965), affd, 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).
1 " See, e.g., Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 241 (1959), acquiesced in on other issues,
1960-1 Cum. Bull. 5; W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932); Columbia
Theatre Co., 3 B.T.A. 622 (1926), acquiesced in, VI-1 Cum. Bull. 2 (1927); Rev. Rul. 66-373,
1966-2 Cum. Bull. 103; cf. Maxwell R. Lenington, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1350 (1966)
(insurance premiums on buildings held for sale a capital expenditure). In Churchill Farms,
Inc., 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 990 (1969), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom, Bayou
Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1971), the Commissioner argued
that liability insurance was necessitated by construction activities and hence should have been
capitalized, but the court, noting that the insurance provided broader coverage than construc-
tion liability, and that it was in force even in years when no construction took place, allowed
the deduction under 162. In his dissenting opinion in George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688, 702
(1968), Judge Featherston argued that the taxpayer in Shainberg was required to capitalize
insurance premiums and certain other costs because they were part of the contract price
(under a cost-plus contract) for a completed shopping center, and thus were "an integral part
of the cost of acquiring the asset intended to be purchased." Id. Thus Shainberg is read not as
authority for capitalizing insurance premiums but rather as holding that the particular
"premiums" in that case were acquisition costs. As to the cost of liability and property damage
insurance paid by the taxpayer to the contractor this view is certainly correct; while the
payments were measured by the contractor's insurance cost they were, to the taxpayer, merely
part of the purchase price of an asset. But the premium in issue in Shainberg was paid for fire
insurance, and was paid to the insurance company rather than to the -contractor. While the
Shainberg opinion is not as clear on this issue as it might have been, the primary reason for
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though some of them have noted that the cost in question did not
add anything to the value of the asset in question. 103 As a matter of
clear reflection of income, insurance during construction should
probably be capitalized, though the matter is not very clear. Con-
struction period insurance may be thought of as a cost of earning
income in the period in which the asset being constructed is used in
the taxpayer's business. This fact does not compel capitalization,
since there is no general requirement that deductions be postponed
until the income corresponding to those deductions is earned. 104 But
a deduction for the direct costs of constructing a capital asset is
deferred until the asset is "placed in service. " 10 S This rule seems to
be largely a matter of convenience; there is no apparent reason apart
from some computational difficulties why depreciation should not
begin as soon as construction begins. Given the generally accepted
practice of postponing deductions for direct construction costs until
completion of the asset, some degree of consistency may be achieved
by postponing deductions for indirect costs like insurance as well.
That is to say, the rule requiring capitalization of direct construction
costs together with the rule that depreciation does not begin until the
asset is placed in service mean that most construction period ex-
penses are not deductible until the asset is completed. Since this is
so, deductions for indirect construction costs like insurance might as
well be postponed like any other cost of acquiring that asset. The
cost of insurance during construction is, as a practical matter, a
necessary cost of erecting a building, and there is no apparent reason
for treating it differently from other construction costs. What must
be capitalized is the "cost" of a building, a term which should
include all costs necessarily incurred in construction. It is artificial to
view cost in such a case as merely the sum of labor and materials. 106.
nondeductibility seems to have been simply that the insurance "was on the buildings diiring
the process of construction." 33 T.C. at 251. The Internal Revenue Service has interpreted
Shainberg as requiring capitalization of insurance during construction. See Rev. Rul. 66-373,
supra.
3 " See, e.g., W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932); cf. Donald B.
Jones, 40 T.C. 249 (1963), remanded on other grounds, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9379 (3d Cir.
1964) (insurance on lives of remaindermen treated as cost of remainder interests in determin-
ing gain on sale).
10° Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1973) ("The full amount of the allowable deduction for
ordinary and necessary expenses in carryingg on a business is nevertheless deductible, even
though such expenses exceed the gross income derived during the taxable year from such
business."); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1973) (income for purpose of § 212 not limited to income
of the taxable year in which deduction is taken).
l" Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(b) (1973). For the meaning of "placed in service," see, e.g.,
Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966); Batman v. Commissioner, 189
F.2d 107 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951); George S, Jephson, .37 B.T.A. 1117
(1938).
l°6 This point may be clarified by comparing the amount that must be capitalized when a
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A strict view of the requirement that a capital expenditure
produce or enhance an asset would suggest that insurance during
construction should be deductible, since it is not an expense that
results directly in the production or enhancement of anything. Re-
conciliation of the rule requiring capitalization of construction insur-
ance with the "asset" theory of capitalization requires that the rela-
tionship between cost and asset necessary for capitalization be
viewed as broader than one of cause and effect. The Tax Court has
described the costs that must be capitalized as those incurred "in
connection with" the acquisition of a capital asset;" 7 this formula-
tion of the relationship seems broad enough to include indirect costs
like insurance among the costs that must be capitalized, while
preserving the requirement that some relationship between 'a cost
and an asset exist if the cost is to be considered a capital expendi-
ture.
In George L. Schultz,'" the Tax Court described the expendi-
tures that must be capitalized as "essential ingredients of the cost of
acquiring property." 109 The taxpayer in Schultz had purchased bulk
whiskey as an investment, and sought to deduct insurance, storage
charges, and estimated ad valorem taxes paid during the period
when the whiskey was being aged. Conceding that such expendi-
tures did not themselves add to the value of the whiskey, and that
similar expenditures in connection with investment property are
normally deductible, the court nevertheless required capitalization
because the whiskey in question was, during the storage period,
going through an aging process that would turn it into four-year-old
whiskey, the product the taxpayer was seeking to acquire. In a
similar case involving whiskey held as inventory, the Court of
Claims allowed a deduction, since it considered the storage in ques-
tion to be part of the "sales phase" of the taxpayer's operations
rather than part of the manufacturing process."°, Both of these cases
support the capitalization of indirect costs incurred during construc-
building is purchased with the amount that must be capitalized when a building is con-
structed. Except for actual savings due to self-construction of capital assets, the amount
capitalized should be the same in both cases. The cost of a purchased building will normally
reflect all of the seller's costs of constructing the building, including construction insurance.
The cost of constructing a building should, therefore, include such indirect costs. This kind of
comparison is harder to apply to the ground rent problem; because of the immobility of
buildings they are not often built on leased land and then sold. But if it were possible to
engage in that kind of dealings with buildings, the seller would undoubtedly regard ground
rent during construction as a cost of the building, which he would have to recover in order to
make a profit.
107
 Ben Perlmutter, 44 T.C. at 403.
'° 50 T.C. 688 (1968).
'°9
 Id. at 696.
II° Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1327, 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
•
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tion, though the opinions seem to differ as to the amount of activity
that constitutes construction. 1 '
B. Ground Rent
Insurance during construction is only one example of the indi-
rect costs that must be capitalized because they are incurred "in
connection with" the construction of a capital asset. Interest on
construction financing and taxes would be others, but for the specific
provisions in the Code allowing their deductibility. 112 The Tax
Court's opinion in Herbert Shainberg 113 has been read as requiring
capitalization of accounting costs and cleaning services during
construction,'" although Shainberg involved a taxpayer who paid
for those items under a cost-plus contract for a completed shopping
center, a circumstance that might mean that the costs were
capitalized not because they were incidental to construction but
because they were part of a purchase price. 115 But ground rent
during construction, unlike other construction period expenditures,
appears to be currently deductible. The Board of Tax Appeals held
in Columbia Theatre Co. 16 that ground rent during construction
was a current expense for excess profits tax purposes,'" and in
Ernest A. fackson" 8 the Tax Court held that ground rent during
construction was a "carrying charge" subject to capitalization unless
'" See also Van Pickerill & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1971).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 163, 164. When tax payments are not deductible under §
164 they must be capitalized or expensed like any other expenditure. See, e.g., George L.
Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968), affd, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970). It is not at all clear why § 263
should not override §§ 163 and 164 to require capitalization of interest and taxes paid in
connection with the construction of assets, but it seems to be generally accepted that it does
not. See, e.g., Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969);
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(a) (1973); 1 S. Surrey, supra note 74, at 409; Hamovit, Construction
Period Expenses, N.Y.U. 29th Inst. on Fed. Tax. (pt. 2) 1075, 1080 (1971); cf. United States
v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972), Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 36, 58-68 (1968), sets forth a number of arguments for the position that
prepaid interest is a capital expenditure; all of Professor Asimow's arguments would apply
with equal force to construction period interest that is not prepaid. The problem with
capitalizing interest and taxes may be that interest and taxes are deductible even when paid
for purely personal purposes, and it may seem anomalous to disallow a deduction when
interest and taxes relate to the production of income in future years while allowing a
deduction when they do not relate to any income at all, A deduction important enough to
override § 262 may be regarded as important enough to override § 263 as well. It is difficult to
fit these provisions into a rational pattern in the absence of a sound reason for the deductibil-
ity of personal interest and many of the taxes enumerated in § 164.
113 33 T.C. 241 (1959). See also Cohn v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas.11 9457 (W.D.
Tenn. 1957), affd, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
"4 See Ben Perlmutter, 44 T.C. at 404.
" 5 See note 102 supra.
16 3 B.T.A. 622 (1926), acquiesced in, VI-1 Cum. Bull. 2 (1927).
' 17 Id.
I " 9 T.C. 307 (1947), affd, 172 F.2c1 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949).
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the taxpayer elected a deduction." 9 In 1969 the Secretary of the
Treasury recommended to the Senate Finance Committee that "the
excess of . . . rent over receipts (if any) from unimproved real
property during the period of construction of improvements" should
be a - tax preference item for purposes of the ten percent minimum
tax. 12° None of these authorities gives any reason for the deductibil-
ity of ground rent during construction. A secondary source lists
ground rent during construction as a "statutorily-authorized" deduc-
tion like interest and taxes, 12 ' citing section 162 and the Regula-
tions. Section 162 alone does not support this position. The mere
listing of a category of expense in that section does not mean that
such an expense need never be capitalized, for all the items listed in
section 162 are deductible only if they are noncapital. For instance,
section 162 mentions salaries, which clearly must be capitalized if
they are paid to employees constructing capital assets. 122
 The Regu-
lations provide modest support for the deductibility of rent during
construction by discussing the requirement that a lessee capitalize
the cost of erecting a building on leased land without mentioning
any need to capitalize rent.' 23
119
 Regulations 69, art. 1561 (1926); cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 266.
In Rev. Rul. 55-118, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 320, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that
delay rentals on oil and gas leases afe carrying charges, which may be deducted unless the
taxpayer elects capitalization under § 266. This ruling does not support the deductibility of
grOund rent during construction because delay rentals, unlike such ground rent, are not
payable during "construction" or during activities equivalent to construction under an oil or
gas lease; indeed, delay rentals are ordinarily paid because of the lessee's failure to develop the
property, and may be avoided by development. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c)(1) (1973).
t 2° Statement of the Honorable David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (Sept. 4, 1969).
121
 Hamovit, Construction Period Expenses (pt. 2), N.Y.U. 29th Inst. on Fed. Tax.
1075, 1083 (1971). Redeemable ground rents, defined in § 1055(c), are mortgages, and rentals
are deductible as interest under § 163(c). The discussion in the text concerns only ground rents
that are not redeemable.
122 See, e.g., Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942).
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11 (1973).
In Flambeau Plastics Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 112 (1963), the taxpayer :sought to
deduct rentals paid on leased land during the construction of a building. The Commissioner
apparently did not argue that the rents should be capitalized, but rather contended that part
of the "rents" were in fact paid for something other than the use of the land, and that the
taxpayer did not show that it had possession or use of the property, so as to meet the
requirement of § 162(a)(3).
There is language in Flambeau Plastics to the effect that tents do not have to be incurred
"in carrying on" a trade or business:
To hold [for the Commissioner], would be to say that a . taxpayer who acquires a
right to eventually use land by virtue of a lease arrangement must use it in the course
of the carrying on of a trade or business before he may be said to have the use
thereof under the statute. The words of section 162(a)(3) are broader in their scope.
The phrase "for purposes of the trade or business" of the taxpayer evidences a clear
congressional intent that such use or possession need not be limited to the carrying
on of a trade or business, but falls within the statutory intendment if the use or
possession is for the-purposes thereof. Certainly petitioner was using the premises
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The distinction between ground rent and insurance as capital
expenditures cannot be explained on clear reflection of income
grounds. Nor does consideration of whether such costs produce or
enhance an asset explain the distinction, since neither expense pro-
duces an asset in the sense of causation, while both are incurred "in
connection with" the production of an asset. The deductibility of
ground rent may derive from viewing the asset to which ground rent
relates as being the land rather than the building. Separate determi-
nation of the cost of a building and the cost of the land on which it is
constructed is normally required because the building is depreciable
while the land is not. Ground rent cannot be capitalized as part of
the cost of land, since the taxpayer is not taking title to the land,'"
and it may be thought to follow therefrom that . it cannot be
capitalized at all. This process of allocating costs between building
and land and capitalizing only those costs allocated to an asset that
is being acquired seems somewhat artificial; a taxpayer who rented
construction equipment to erect a building would clearly have to
capitalize the rent paid, and ground rent during construction is as
much a cost of that construction as the rental of space in which
capital assets are built, or of equipment used to construct capital
assets, is a cost of those assets.' 25 No such distinction is drawn in
the cases involving construction period insurance. 126 If construction ,
within the statutory meaningkl immediately it began to oversee and supervise the
construction of the building which construction clearly had no other purpose than to
house the petitioner's business. It had a clear right under the lease to oust anyone
(other than those engaged in construction . of the building) including Realty, the
lessor. We find it also had statutory possession upon the execution of the lease.
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem, at 115 (emphasis' by the court).
Similar reasoning might be used to support the position that rents are a unique kind of
deduction not subject to the requirement of "ordinariness." But the least strained reading of §
162 is that the "purposes thereof" language stressed by the court merely denies a deduction for
rent paid on nonbusiness property. The "carrying on" requirement, as well as the "ordinary
and necessary" requirement, applies to all 162(a) deductions, one of which is rent. The
legislative history of § 162 does not support the court's view of the "clear congressional
intent." The addition of a specific reference to rent and of the "purposes thereof" phrase to the
predecessor of § 162 was intended to allow "the same deductions from gross income as under
existing law." H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 20ess. 10 (1918). The "existing law" referred
to was comparable to the first paragraph of § 162(a), including the "carrying on" requirement.
$24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3)•
125 That there is no corresponding cost when a building is constructed on land the
taxpayer owns is due to the nondepreciability of land, not to the necessity of allocating costs
between land and building. If there were such a thing as depreciable land, as might be the
case if a taxpayer were constructing improvements on an island that was being washed away
by the sea, it would seem proper to allocate depreciation during construction to the cost of the
building.
126 Similar reasoning in the case of construction insurance would permit deductibility on
the grounds that the asset purchased with an insurance premium is insurance, which lusts
only for the period for which the premium is paid.
Compare the cases holding that the cost of such assets as roads, water systems and
sewage disposal systems constructed by a developer may be capitalized as part of the basis of
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period insurance costs are capital expenditures, ground rent during
construction should also be a capital expenditure.
IV. EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES
A few cases,' 27 and more than a few commentators,' 28 have
explained the nondeductibility of the costs of some kinds of edu-
cation on capital expenditure grounds. The Regulations describe
nondeductible educational expenditures (those required to meet the
minimum educational requirements of a trade or business and those
that qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business) as ;`personal
expenditures or ... an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital
expenditures.':" 9 This area is worth examining, not only because
educational expenditures constitute an important and much-litigated
area, but also because of the light the educational expenditure cases
may shed on the limitation of capital expenditures to  costs that
produce or enhance an asset. If an education is not an asset, the
educational expenditure cases must be explained on some basis other
than that of capitalization, unless a major exception to the normal
rules regarding capitalization is recognized. If an education is an
asset, or if educational expenditures are capital expenditures even
the lots they were constructed to serve: Willow Terrace Dev, Co. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d
933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965); Commissioner v. Offutt, 336 F.2d 483 (4th
Cir. 1964); Cambria Dev. Co., 34 B.T.A. 1155 (1936), acquiesced in part, nonacquiesced in
part, 1937-1 Cum. Bull. 4, 31. If a cost that enhances asset A can be capitalized as part of the
cost of asset 8, a fortiori a cost that does not enhance asset A may be treated as part of the
cost of asset B even though it relates to asset A as well as to asset B. Cf. note 29 supra.
127 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) (dictum); Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956
(1950) (alternative holding); James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944) (alternative holding);
Richard Henry Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1952) ("might be"). See also Arthur M.
Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581 (1970).
128 Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1089 (1964), does not examine in any detail the question of whether educational
expenditures can in themselves be capital, and at one point even seems to suggest the opposite
by pointing out that research expenditures that do produce an "asset" such as a marketable
book may have to be capitalized. Id. at 1090-91 n.9, 1112. Professor Wolfman goes on,
however, to describe a professional education as an "intangible capital asset." Id. at 1093,
1112. Shaw, Education as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carrying on a Trade or
Business, 19 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1963), argues that some educational expenditures are capital, as
does Comment, The Deductibility of Educational Expenses: Administrative Construction of
Statute, 17 Buffalo L. Rev. 182 (1968). See also R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax 82-93
(1964), a discussion which seems to be colored to a considerable extent by the author's view
that "it is good social policy to resolve doubts in favor of more liberal writeoffs." Id. at 92.
The American Law Institute in its Federal Income Tax Statute defines capital expenditures as
including expenditures for the acquisition, development, or improvement of "an asset, in-
terest, or income-producing status" having a useful life beyond the close of the taxable year.
ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X166(a) (Feb. 1954 Draft). The comments indicate that this
wording, which is "not meant to deviate from the general trend of the existing cases," is
intended to apply to educational expenditures.
129
 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)-1 (1973).
472
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
though they do not produce an asset, the existing rule denying
depreciation of educational costs is unsound.
Determination of whether educational expenditures are capital
is necessary only in the case of expenditures having some connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business. Expenditures not so con-
nected, such as expenditures undertaken for education unrelated to
the taxpayer's business, are personal, and so are nondeductible
under section 262 whether or not they create or enhance an asset.
Thus a lawyer's expenses in learning to play the piano or fly air-
planes would ordinarily be nondeductible as personal expenses,
making consideration of whether they are capital expenditures un-
necessary.
An education is probably not an asset. No entirely satisfactory
definition of an "asset" or of "property," which is probably the same
thing, seems possible, and in capitalization cases the courts have, for
the most part, prudently refrained from attempting to define "asset."
But it is reasonably clear that what we call "property" has two
characteristics distinguishing it from what we do not call property:
property is subject to ownership, and hence to being transferred
from one person to another,'" and property involves some degree of
legal protection against interference by others. 131 Thus things
everyone would agree are property, such as land or copyrights, are
both transferable and subject to a considerable amount of protection
by the law; things that are perhaps less clearly property, such as
licenses to engage in particular businesses, are frequently nontrans-
ferable and may not be assured of the same degree of legal protec-
tion as are land or copyrights. A few forms of knowledge have been
treated as property for one purpose or another; thus in International
News Service v. Associated Press, 132 the Supreme Court upheld an
injunction against publishing news that had been gathered by the
plaintiff. Justice Brandeis dissented, believing that the knowledge in
question was not something the law had previously considered prop-
erty and that, while a legislature might want to make it property,
with appropriate safeguards against abuse of that status, the court
1" Not all specific items of property are transferable, of course, but the nontransferabil-
ity of a liquor license, for example, is something imposed upon the holder of that property by
the state because it is thought to be convenient to do so, while the nontransferability of an
education is more or less inherent in its nature..
131 See, e.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733, 771 (1964). Most of the
definitions of "property" in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) refer to "rights" of one sort
or another; most of the definitions of "asset" refer to "property." For an interesting discussion
of what contract rights can be "assets" for purposes of applying the capital gains provisions,
sec Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962), where the court treats as assets
those rights that would be protected in equity.
"2 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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should not. 133 Novel ideas not properly the subject of patent or
copyright have sometimes been protected against exploitation, 134
and even for tax purposes it is recognized that "know-how" can be
an asset.' 35 But all of these exceptions involve knowledge that is
both unique and of some immediate practical use; the kind of
knowledge attained by spending money in a nondeductible way, for
example, the knowledge gained as a result of a legal education, is
not protected•by the Government in any way that can be said to give
that knowledge the status of property. Indeed, there is no need for
such protection; no one can steal someone else's education.
Education, then, is unlike most things that are considered as-
sets. And it is difficult to see how the scope of the asset concept can
be extended to education without rendering meaningless the state-
ment that production or enhancement of an asset is what distin-
guishes capital expenditures yielding benefits in future years from
currently deductible expenditures yielding such benefits. For if an
education is an asset, why is not any other benefit such as reputa-
tion, or health, or good relations with customers, or public knowl-
edge of the benefits of using a particular product?
The earliest cases and rulings disallowing deductions for the
costs of learning state that such costs are not deductible because they
are "personal." 136 Both the cases and the rulings are so cryptic that
one must extract general principles from them with some hesitation,
but their failure to examine the particular circumstances of the
educations involved at least suggests that the Internal Revenue
Service and the Board of Tax Appeals felt that any acquisition of
knowledge was necessarily personal. The early rule of nondeducti-
bility of the costs of acquiring knowledge was never absolute; costs
of attending professional meetings were held deductible,' 37 and col-
lege professors were sometimes permitted to deduct the costs of
engaging in research related to their teaching,' 38
 though as recently
133
 Id. at 248, 250-51 (dissenting opinion).
1J4
 See, e.g., Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1952), affd, 210
F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
133
 See, e.g., Taylor-Winfield Corp., 57 T.C. 205 (1971), affd mem., 467 F.2d 483 (6th
Cir. 1972); United States Mineral Prods. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969), acquiesced in, 1969-2 Cum.
Bull. xxv; Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989 (1962), acquiesced in, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 4. But see Rev.
Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 133.
136
 T.F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (cost of music lessons "in anticipation of vocal
engagements in a professional capacity"); Jay N. Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926), acquiesced in,
VI-1 Cum. Bull. 2 (1927) (cartoonist's expenses in connection with work undertaken in order
to become a sculptor); O.D. 984, 5 Cum. Bull. 171 (1921) (costs of doctors' taking post-
graduate courses); O.D. 892, 4 Cum. Bull. 209 (1921), revoked, I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. Bull.
16 (expenses of teacher attending summer school).
137
 Alexander Silverman, 6 E.T.A. 1328, acquiesced in, VI-2 Cum. Bull. 6 (1927).
138
 I.T. 1520, 1-2 Cum. Bull. 145 (1922), revoked, I.T. 2688, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 251
(1933), held that such expenses were "personal," but G.C.M. 11,654, X11- 1 Cum. Bull. 250
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as 1962 the Tax Court denied a deduction for such costs in the case
of a tenured faculty member, reasoning that the expenses were not
"necessary." 19 Not until 1950 was a taxpayer allowed to deduct the
costs of formal classroom instruction. 140 In 1958 detailed regulations
governing the deduction of educational expenditures were issued.
These regulatioris provided that the costs of education undertaken
"primarily for the purpose of" maintaining or improving skills re-
quired by the taxpayer's business or meeting the conditions' of the
taxpayer's continued employment were deductible."' The cost of
obtaining education for the purpose of securing a new or better
position or of "fulfilling the general educational aspirations or other
personal purposes of the taxpayer" was expressly ruled
nondeductible. 142 The Regulations were revised in 1967 to eliminate
the necessity of determining a taxpayer's purpose in acquiring an
education; the tests today are whether the education maintains or
improves employment skills or meets the express requirements of
employment, and does not meet minimum educational requirements
of a business or qualify the taxpayer •for a new trade or business. 143
The idea that the cost of obtaining an education can be a
capital expenditure derives from dictum in Welch v. Helvering, 144
where Justice Cardozei said that "[r]eputation and learning are akin
to capital assets, like the good will of an old partnership. . . . For
many, they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to
success. The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely
spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a
business. " 145 This statement does not necessarily mean that educa-
tional expenditures are or indeed can ever be capital. The Court's
expressed concern in Welch v. Helvering was with the statutory
requirement that deductible expenses be "ordinary," and while
much in the opinion 'suggests that "ordinary" means "noneapital,"
there are indications too that it means more than that, and that
"unique" or "unusual" expenditures are nondeductible irrespective
(1933), held to'the contrary after the Commissioner had lost a number of cases involving more
or less similar expenses. G.C.M. 11,654 stated that the costs of research by a college professor
may be deductible depending on whether they are capital expenditures, a position that was
reaffirmed in Rev. Rul. 63.275, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 85.
139 Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962) (remanded pursuant to agreement of the parties
in the Ninth Circuit, 1964). For a discussion of the Davis case, see Wolfman, supra note 128,
at 1089-91, 1104-05.
149 Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958), amended by T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. Hull. 36 (1967).
142 Id .
14' Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967). The validity of the 1967 regulations was upheld by the
Tax Court in Ronald F. Weisxmann, 52 'I'.C. 1106 (1969), affd, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971).
'" 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
145 Id. at 115-16.
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of whether they are capital, with uniqueness determined by looking
to the practice of the industry, rather than the particular taxpayer.
Apart from Welch v. Helvering there is very little support in the
cases for the view that educational expenses are ever capital. No
case has ever held that a nonpersonal educational expenditure not
related to some asset other than the education itself146 was non-
deductible solely because it was a capital expenditure. Perhaps the
closest approach to such a finding is James M. Osborn, 147 in which
the Tax Court described the research expenses of a scholar who
sought to develop a reputation so that he could obtain a teaching
position as being "in essence the cost of the capital structure from
which his future income is to be derived;" 148 but in Osborn the
primary reason given for nondeductibility was that the taxpayer was
not engaged in a trade or business. 149 In Knut F. Larson, ' 50 the Tax
Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a mechanic's expenses
in obtaining an engineering degree were capital or personal since
they were clearly one or the other and were nondeductible in either
case."' In Richard Henry Lampkin, 152 the Tax Court suggested
that a scholar's expectation of some reimbursement for, his outlays
"might" make capitalization proper, and went on to hold that the
146
 Acceptance of the view that an education is not an asset for capitalization purposes
does not compel the conclusion that no expenditure that produces knowledge can be a capital
expenditure. If the product of an expenditure is knowledge relating to some asset other than
the knowledge itself, the expenditure should be capitalized. Thus in Louisiana Land &
Exploration Co., 7 T.C. 507 (1946), affd, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947), the cost of conducting
geophysical surveys on land leased to the taxpayer for oil drilling was held to be a capital
expenditure. I.T. 4006, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 48, sets forth a method of allocation of the costs of
such surveys to specific properties. See also Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., 12 T.C. 760
(1949), affd, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950); Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 321 (1955).
It is apparently these kinds of research expenditures (i.e., those leading to the production of
some asset other than knowledge) that are meant to be excluded from deductibility on capital
expenditure grounds in Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 85, and in G.C.M. 11,654,
XII-1 Cum. Bull. 250 (1933). Cf. Edward R. Godfrey, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. I, 7 (1963),
ant, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1965) (costs of unsuccessful
attempt to have property rezoned and of survey to determine best use of property held capital
expenditures).
In Rev. Rul, 56-600, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 171, the cost of acquiring and developing air
routes was held a capital expenditure. While many of the costs involved may have produced
assets, such as a license to use a particular route, or maps, these assets account for less than
the entire cost of a mute. What was produced seems to be, essentially, knowledge. While as a
general rule knowledge seems an unsatisfactory kind of asset, an exception might be made for
the acquisition of specific practical information of use for no purpose other than the conduct of
a taxpayer's business. This kind of knowledge is much like the "know-how" that is a
recognized asset for purposes of §§ 1021 and 1031. .
147
 3 T.C. 603 (1944).
146
 Id. at 605.
149 Id .
150 15 T.C. 956 (1950).
151
 Id. at 958.
151
 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1952).
476
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
expenses in question were "personal" and so nondeductible.' 53
Courts allowing a deduction for educational expenditures have from
time to time taken the trouble to hold that they are noncapital, as in
Coughlin v. Commissioner, 154 where the Second Circuit, .after hold-
ing that a lawyer's expenses in attending a tax institute were nonper-
sonal, observed that "the rather evanescent character of that for
which the [taxpayer] spent his money deprives it of the sort of
permanency [the capital asset] concept embraces."'" The case for
the capital nature of educational expenditures thus rests upon dicta,
inferences from findings that particular educational expenditures
were noncapital, and an occasional alternative holding. Such au-
thorities might be persuasive if there were nothing on the other side,
but that is not the case. The nondepreciability of educational expen-
ditures, the nature of the distinctions drawn in both the current
Regulations and the 1958  Regulations between deductible and non-
deductible educational expenditures, and the abundance of authority
for disallowing deductions for the kinds of education thought to be
capital on the ground that such education is personal (or at least not
incurred in carrying on a trade or business) all suggest that capital
expenditure concepts need play no part in the educational expense
area.
If the costs of obtaining an education are in fact capital expen-
ditures a taxpayer ewho uses his education in his trade or business
should be able to recover those costs through depreciation or amorti-
zation. But the four cases in which this issue was presented have
denied the deduction. One case denies a deduction for amortization
on the sole ground that there is no authority for allowing such a
deduction,' 56
 another denies a deduction on the ground that the cost
of education to qualify for a new trade or business is a personal
expense,'" and the remaining two cases rely solely on stare
decisis. 158
 Commentators who argue that educational expenditures
are capital explain their nondepreciability by saying that such ex-
penditures do not have an ascertainable useful life. 159 There is no
authority to support this explanation, 16 ° and amortization of such
intangible assets as a franchise and the right to practice medicine in
.153 Id. at 577.
154 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
155
 Id. at 310.
156 Huene v. United States, 247 F. Stipp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
157 Nathaniel A. Denman, 48 T.C. 439 (1967), acquiesced in, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 2.
15° David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971); Walter F. Maxwell, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1356 (1970).
159 Wolfman, supra note 128, at 1093; Shaw, supra note 128, at 29-30; Comment, supra
note 128, at 209.
160 It is only fair to point out that all of these articles were published before there was
any case law denying depreciation of educational expenditures.
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a hospital has been allowed when the utility of the asset is limited to
the life of the taxpayer) 6 ' A taxpayer's life expectancy is at least as
predictable as most other useful lives. The nondepreciability of
educational expenditures can be justified only if the disallowance of
a deduction for such expenditures is based on some ground other
than capitalization.
The nature of the distinctions drawn by the Regulations be-
tween deductible and nondeductible educational expenditures can-
not be satisfactorily explained by the use of capital expenditure
concepts.- The Regulations do allow a deduction for the costs of
"maintaining" existing skills,' while denying a deduction for the costs
of developing new skills. This distinction is analogous to that made
between repair and maintenance expenditures, which are de-
ductible, and the costs of building new equipment, which are capi-
tal. But the analogy breaks down when the intermediate class of
education expenditures is considered, for the costs of "improving"
business skills are deductible, while the costs of "improvements" in
general are expressly made capital by section 263) 62 A strong argu-
ment for the noncapital nature of educational expenses can be made
by considering the kinds of educational expenditures that are deduc-
tible. Consider, for example, a secondary school teacher who obtains
a master's degree and who accordingly is entitled to receive, for the
rest of his working life, a higher salary than his less well-educated
colleagues. Quite, apart from any benefits such a person may derive
from picking up new ,knowledge, his degree itself will provide him
with substantial, measurable benefits for many years to come. No
clearer example of an educational expenditure that is related to the
production of future years' income can be found than this, yet the
expenditure is currently deductible) 63 If an education, or even a
degree, can be an asset, expenses like these should be nondeductible.
If, on the other hand, an education or a degree is not an asset, the'
deductibility of such expenses can be explained as an application of
161
 See Hampton Pontiac, Inc, v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1073 (1).S.C. 1969)
(payments to acquire an automobile dealership amortized over life expectancy of dealer where
dealer's franchise unlikely to be renewed after his death); Glenn L. Heigerick, 45 T.C. 475
(1966) (medical staff fee held capital expenditure; Commissioner allowed amortization over
doctor's life expectancy); Stephen J. Thiel, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 212 (1966) (same); Robert
C. Hill, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 213 (1966) (same); Leon G. Hunter, 25 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem.
214 (1966) (same); Edward M. Slowik, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 214 (1966) (same); E. Vance
Walters, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 215 (1966), affd, 383 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1967) (same); Rev.
Rul. 70-171, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 55 (same); cf. Wells-Lee v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 665 (8th
Cir. 1966) (medical staff fee amortized over life of hospital).
762
 The 1958 Regulations, as first proposed, would have allowed a deduction only for
expenditures to "maintain" existing skills as opposed to "improving" them. Shaw, supra note
128, at 6 n.32.
1s3
 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), example 1 (1973).
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the limitation of capital expenditures to costs that produce or en-
hance an asset.
The costs of obtaining an education enabling a taxpayer to meet
the minimum educational requirements of his profession or to qual-
ify for a new trade or business are the nondeductible educational
costs that seem most like capital expenditures. The nondeductibility
of these costs can, however, be satisfactorily explained on grounds
other than that of their capital nature. In the first place, most costs
such as these relate to a trade or business other than that in which
the taxpayer was engaged at the time he incurred them, and thus do
not satisfy the requirement that deductible expenses be incurred "in
carrying on any trade or business," or in carrying on equivalent
activities under section 212. 164 This justification for nondeductibility
clearly covers all the educational expenses that were expressly ruled
nondeductible under the 1958 Regulations. While the new Regu-
lations may disallow some expenses that are incurred for purposes
related to an existing trade or business of the taxpayer, this change
in practice is probably better explained as an attempt at achieving
administrative convenience and avoiding the difficulties of proving a
taxpayer's "purpose" in undertaking education than as reflecting the
acceptance of capital expenditure principles. Furthermore, it is not
unreasonable to regard the costs of obtaining the kinds of learning
that qualify a taxpayer for a new trade or business as "personal" in
the sense that they are consumption rather than (or as well as) the
costs of earning income. The costs of obtaining high school and
undergraduate educations, at least, surely provide personal satis-
factions to so great an . extent that they should be nondeductible
under section 262. Some people undoubtedly incur even these costs
primarily for business reasons, but any attempt to reward those
oblivious to the nonfinancial benefits of learning by letting them
deduct the costs of their general education would be an administra-
tive horror at best,'" and many costs are treated as "personal" even
IM. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162; see notes 174-82 infra and accompanying text.
Expenditures that arc outside the scope of § 162 and § 212 because the taxpayer is not
carrying on a trade or business are sometimes referred to as "capital expenditures." If this is
all that is meant by the reference in the regulations to "capital expenditures," then it is
unimportant whether an education is an asset or not, except with regard to depreciation or
amortization. But the authorities cited in note 128 supra appear to be using "capital expendi-
ture" in the sense of "improvements" under § 263. See also Arthur M. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581
(1970), discussing whether the taxpayer, a university teaching assistant, was engaged in a
trade or business, but also citing § 263. Much of the language in the educational expenditure
regulations seems to be adapted from the kinds of language normally used in connection with
tangible property. Compare the references to "maintaining" and "improving" skills in the
educational expenditure regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1973), with the references to
"conservation" and "maintenance" of tangible property, Treas. Reg, § 1.212-1 (1973).
165
 R. Goode, supra note 128, at 84-89, proposes a plan for allowing amortization of the
costs of any course creditable toward earning a college degree, vocational training at "recog-
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though some may incur them solely for profit. 166 Much the same sort
of argument can be made, though perhaps with less force, for the
"personal" nature of the costs of attending graduate or professional
schools. While the conduct of a business is regarded as a nonper-
sonal activity, the choice of the business or profession that a man
will enter can be thought of as a personal choice. The day-to-day
decisions that a lawyer makes, for example, may be regarded as
business decisions in a sense in which the decision to become a
lawyer in the first place was not. If this is so, it is perhaps sound to
treat the costs of becoming a lawyer as personal expenses even
though those costs will someday help to earn income. In United
States v. Gilmore, 16 ' Justice Harlan described Congress as regarding
an individual as having, for tax purposes, two personalities, one
seeking profit, the other satisfying human needs.' 68 The costs of
becoming a member of a profession, however closely related to a
man's profit-seeking personality, may well be even more strongly
associated with the "human needs" side of his nature. To quote
Professor Blum out of context, these costs "go to the individual as a
whole person rather than to him as merely a businessman: 1169 There
is at least as much support in the cases for this view of nondeducti-
ble educational expenditures as there is for the position that such
expenditures are capital,'" and this explanation is consistent with
denial of amortization of educational expenditures.
nized" trade schools, refresher courses and correspondence courses. He would allow the
amortization deduction to be taken only against earned income. He proposes that students be
allowed to amortize the cost of an education paid for by parents, relatives and friends, but not
the cost of an education paid for by universities or governments. The reason given for denying
a deduction to the parents who actually pay educational expenditures is that such a deduction
"could not be justified as a refinement in the measurement of the parents' earnings." Id. at 92.
This is perfectly true, but Goode apparently fails to recognize that allowing the deduction to
the students in such a case cannot be justified as a refinement in the measurement of their
incomes either, since it would allow them deductions for costs they have not incurred. Any
"unfairness" involved in denying a student a deduction for the cost of his education seems to
be more than outweighed by the allowance of tax-free scholarships, fellowships and gifts.
` 66
 Some commuting expenses, costs of clothing purchased for business reasons but
suitable for nonbusiness wear, and the cost of a large residence purchased and maintained in
order to impress clients are a few examples.
167
 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
' 66 Id. at 44.
169
 Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev.
485, 527 (1967).
' 7°
 For example, in David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970), the court, in rejecting the
contention that fees paid to secure employment were personal, described the fees as "paid for
the limited purpose of securing employment at a particular time .. There was no element
... of qualifying for a new trade or business or better preparing oneself to take advantage of
any number of unknown opportunities or of making life more enjoyable generally." 54 T.C. at
381 (emphasis in the original). The inference is clearly that the costs of qualifying for a new
trade or business are personal. In Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962), the court described
the expenses in question as personal, since they were incurred to increase the taxpayer's
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What has been said above about educational expenditures ap-
plies with equal force to several similar problems. In particular,
employment agency fees and other, costs of obtaining a better job
clearly relate to future years' income, yet they do riot always produce
or enhance an "asset," and a Tax Court concurring opinion has said
that they are not capital expenditures for that reason. 171 The costs of
enhancing one's reputation for integrity, on the other hand, are
generally treated as capital expenditures,' 72 though the leading case,
Welch v. Helvering, can and perhaps should be interpreted
otherwise. 173
V. BUSINESS EXPANSION COSTS
Many of the normal expenses of a going business make some
contribution toward earning income in years other than the year in
which the expenses are incurred. Advertising costs, the costs of
training personnel and the costs of devising and implementing im-
proved business practices are some examples. A strict view of
capitalization might require deferral of part of such costs on the
theory that income is distorted by allowing a current deduction for
prestige. The holding that the particular expenses involved were personal seems questionable,
but the suggestion that there can be a personal •element in acquiring prestige seems sound.
I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 16, states that "expenses incurred for the purpose of obtaining a
teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status, a higher position, , . are ... personal
expenses." Id. at 17. See also Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951). Wolfman, supra note 128, at
1100-01, argues that the Cardoso court's conclusion that expenses to create advancement,
professional prestige and reputation are "personal" is erroneous, citing Welch and Osborn.
There is considerably more authority for calling these expenses personal than for calling them
capital. The 1958 Regulations did not mention capital expenditures at all; the present Regula-
tions refer to nondeductible educational expenditures as "personal expenditures or ... an
inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures." Treas. Reg. * 1,162-5(b)(1)
(1973). As a practical matter, the only direct significance of the classification of educational
expenditures as personal or capital concerns depreciability; and all the cases involving that
issue deny depreciation. See notes 156-58 supra.
' 1 See David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. at 381-82 (Tannenwald, 3., concurring). Judge
Tannenwald goes on to state, however, that the capital expenditure concept includes "prep-
aration for engaging in a new field of endeavor." Id. at 382. Since the cost of preparation for
engaging in a new field of endeavor will always be nondeductible because,not an expense of
an existing trade or business, it seems to make little practical difference whether such costs are
or arc not capital expenditures, so long as amortization of such costs is not allowed.
172 See note 70 supra.
17' I do not mean to suggest that the word "ordinary" in § 162 should be construed to
disallow any expenditures other than capital expenditures. I am merely suggesting that the
expenditures involved in Welch were not capital expenditures, and that it is more satisfactory
to interpret Welch as holding merely that the expenditures in question were not ordinary, even
if that interpretation required interpreting "ordinary" as more broad than "noncapital," than
to read Welch as a capital expenditure case, The distinction drawn in the cases cited in note
70 supra, which strikes me as being unsound, appears to derive from the view that Welch
involved capital expenditures. For a case holding that "ordinary" means more than "noncapi-
tal," see, e.g., Consumers Water Co. v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9189 (D. Me.
19741.
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costs attributable to earning future years' income. Ordinarily, the
regular recurrence of costs such as these, the likelihood that most of
the contribution of such costs toward earning income takes place in
or near the year in which the costs are incurred, and the impossibil-
ity of making a rational allocation of such costs between current and
future years justify current deductibility. A more difficult question is
presented when a taxpayer incurs an unusually large cost of this sort
under circumstances indicating that some long-range benefit was the
primary reason for incurring the cost, as when a company spends
large sums to advertise a new product, or to train its employees to
operate new equipment,. or to obtain a new group of customers.
Whether costs such as these should be capitalized cannot yet be
considered as settled.
This section will examine the question whether the costs de-
scribed above are capital expenditures. This inquiry requires con-
sideration not only of whether such costs produce assets but also of
whether capitalization of 'such costs is necessary to clearly reflect
income. Even if capitalization is regarded simply as a problem of
determining whether a cost has produced an asset, consideration of
whether capitalization of that cost clearly reflects income is neces-
sary - in order to determine whether viewing the re'sults of particular
expenditures as "assets" or as "not assets" is desirable. That is to
say, clear reflection of income may be used as a standard for judging
whether the "asset" theory of capital expenditures produces satisfac-
tory results. But clear reflection of income considerations may also
provide an alternative to the search for an asset; in the case of de
minimis asset-producing expenditures, a current deduction for costs
that did produce assets was permitted on clear reflection of income
grounds in Cincinnati Ry., and a similar approach may be useful in
the case of business expansion costs.
It is worth noting that the problem of whether the costs of
extensive advertising, employee training or expansion of a business
into new lines of endeavor must be capitalized is distinct from the
problem of whether such costs are nondeductible because they are
not incurred "in carrying on any trade or business." 174
 The costs of
investigating • new business opportunities and developing a new
business are nondeductible under section 162 when incurred prior to
the time the taxpayer's activities reach the level of a trade or
business. ] " Nor are such costs deductible as expenses for the pro-
114 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,	 162.
"5 The leading case is Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953). Cf. Charles T. Parker, I T.C.
709 (1943). Such expenditures may sometimes be deducted as a loss on a transaction entered
into for profit, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(c)(2), provided the taxpayer's activities go
beyond "investigation." See Rev, Rul. 57-418, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 143, attempting to distin-
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duction of income under section 212; although that section contains
no reference to a trade or business and appears, on its face, broad
enough to encompass nonpersonal investigatory and start-up ex-
penses, the Supreme Court has held that the predecessor of section
212 merely extended the concept that only net income is to be taxed
to income from activities that cannot be characterized as a trade or
business. 176 Deductions under section 212 are thus "coextensive with
the business deductions allowed by [section 162]," 1 " and are "sub-
ject to the same limitations and restrictions that are applicable to
those allowable under [section 162]." 178 In short, there is a "carrying
on" limitation to deductions under section 212 as well as to deduc-
tions under section 162, though what must be "carried on" under
section 212 may be investment rather than a business. The limita-
tion of deductions for costs incurred in profit-seeking activities to
costs incurred in carrying on a trade or business (or section 212's
equivalent of a trade or business) has been criticized,'" as has the
courts' unnecessarily restrictive application of the "carrying on"
requirement'in particular cases.'" The point here is that, notwith-
standing the tendency of the courts to confuse the two issues,'" the
nondeductibility of costs because they do not meet the "carrying on"
requirement has nothing to do with the nondeductibility of capital
expenditures. Expenditures outside the scope of sections 162 or 212
are nondeductible irrespective of whether they are capital expendi-
tures, and expenditures that are capital are nondeductible irrespec-
tive of whether they are incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
That many expenditures may be nondeductible for both reasons' 82
does not mean that the reasons are the same.
guish Frank from Parker. In Theodore R. Price, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1405-3 (1971), the
Tax Court held that the expenses in question were deductible under § 165 because they could
have been capitalized if the project had been successful. See generally Fleischer, The Tax
Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation for a Business or Capital Investment, 14 Tax
L. Rev, 567 (1959).
"6  McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
177
 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945).
178 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 45 (1963).
179
 See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should He Nar-
rowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev, 1142, 1145-47 (1943);
Fleischer, supra note 175. •
16° See, e.g., Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They Deductible by a Corporation for
Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 48 Taxes 488 (1970).
1111
 For example, the court in Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901
(4th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965), said that "expenses
incurred prior to and for the purpose of reaching a decision whether to establish a business are
indisputably capital expenditures." 345 F.2d at 905 n.4. The court went on, however, to treat
the "carrying on" requirement and the capitalization question as separate issues.
182
 See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965), for a
case where most of the expenses in question were held nondeductible both because they were
incurred before the taxpayer's activities constituted a trade or business and because they were
capital expenditures.
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Current deductibility of advertising expenses is well-
established. 183 An early Court of Claims case held that the cost of a
nationwide advertising campaign necessary to induce manufacturers
and retailers to enter into valuable contracts with the taxpayer could
be capitalized for income tax and excess profits tax purposes. 184
There is language in some early opinions of the Board of Tax
Appeals to the effect that part of the costs of extensive advertising
campaigns could be capitalized if evidence to establish a reasonable
allocation were available, but the cases sustain the Commissioner's
determination that none of the costs are capital because of failure to
introduce such evidence. 185
 By World War II, however, the deduc-
tibility of advertising costs was so well-established that even the
advertising of taxpayers engaged in war production, made to main-
tain goodwill until the taxpayers' return to peacetime production,
was held to be an ordinary and necessary expense if reasonable in
amount. 186
 Even the costs of influencing proposed legislation, which
might be considered advertising expenses of a sort, are currently
deductible to the extent they are allowable at all, though most such
expenses seem as much a cost of future years' income as of current
income.'" There are, however, two well-established exceptions to
the noncapital treatment of advertising costs: (1) the cost of advertis-
ing to increase the circulation of a periodical is a capital expenditure
(though this issue is now largely mooted by section 173, which
permits a taxpayer to expense such costs); and (2) the cost of adver-
tising that involves the purchase or construction of tangible assets is
a capital expenditure.
The circulation expense cases proceed on the theory that the
circulation structure of a publication is an "intangible asset," and
that the cost of improving such an asset is, by analogy to the cost of
improving physical property, a capital expenditure, while the cost of
' 83 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (1973) provides that institutional advertising costs are
"generally" deductible "provided the expenditures are related to the patronage the taxpayer
might reasonably expect in the future."
' 88 United Profit-Sharing Corp. v. United States, 1 U.S. Tax Cas.11 319 (Ct. Cl. 1928).
"5 Colonial Ice Cream Co., 7 B.T.A. 154 (1927); Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6 B.T,A.
1247 (1927), aff'd, 29 F,2d 262 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 844 (1929); Northwest-
ern Yeast Co., 5 B.T.A. 232 (1926), acquiesced in, VI-2 Cum. Bull. 5 (1927). In all of these
cases it was the taxpayer who sought capitalization, which would have increased "invested
capital" for excess profits tax purposes.
1116 I.T. 3581, 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 88, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 68-100, 1968-1 Cum.
Bull. 572. It is hard to think of a clearer example than this of advertising costs, related to
future years' rather than to current year's income.
' 87 The rules governing the deductibility of lobbying and other political expenses are
spelled out in Treas. Reg, § 1.162-20 (1973). See generally Cooper, The Tax Treatment of
• Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68
Coium. L. Rev. 801 (1968).
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maintaining the structure at its existing level is a current expense. 188
The application of the distinction between "maintaining" and "im-
proving" circulation proved difficult, and Congress enacted section
173 in order to reduce uncertainty by permitting all such expendi-
tures to be expensed.' 89 The circulation expense cases are inconsis-
tent with the general rule that advertising expenses are currently
deductible. Most advertising is aimed at increasing the number of
customers of a business, and there is no apparent reason to require
capitalization merely because the taxpayer is a publisher, or because
the existence of customers can be , given a name like "circulation
structure," which sounds like the name of an asset.
The reasoning of the circulation expense cases has occasionally
been applied in cases involving taxpayers who are not publishers. In
Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner,'" for example, the
court held that the salaries and expenses of solicitors who persuaded
gas users to become customers of the taxpayer, rather than its rival,
were capital expenditures because the taxpayer acquired "something
of permanent use or value in the business" in the form of "new
customers," "good will" and "elimination of competition."'"
The cost of advertising accomplished through the purchase or
construction of tangible property must be capitalized and written off
over the life of the property. Thus the cost of advertising signs and
similar property must be capitalized and depreciated over the life of
the signs. 192
Where the taxpayer's relations with its customers take the form
of leases, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that salesmen's
commissions and bonuses must be capitalized as part of the cost of
the lease,' 93
 though another ruling on similar facts holds that adver-
See cases listed in note 70 supra.
1" S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 483, 529.
19° 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937).
1 " 90 F.2d at 816. A rather cryptic ruling holds that payments for unspecified "activities
necessary in the promotion and advertising of the taxpayer's products in connection with an
exhibit at a fair" are capital expenditures amortizable over "the periods during which the fair
was in operation." Rev. Rul. 68-283, 1968-i CuM, Bull. 63, 64. The ruling may be merely an
application of the rule requiring deferral of the prepaid cost of services until the period in
which the services are performed.
1" See, e.g., Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 28 CCH Tax Ct, Mem. 635 (1969) (signs,
clocks and athletic field scoreboards); Liberty Ins. Bank, 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929), rev'd on
other grounds, 59 F.2d 32D (Gth Cir. 1932) (novelty savings banks distributed to bank's
customers); Rev. Rul. 66-277, 1966-2 Cum. Bull. 42 (payments by a professional sports club to
finance construction of a "hall of fame"). But see E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner, 214
F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1954) (catalogues). In all of these cases the asset in question was not owned
by the taxpayer. Utility of the asset in the taxpayer's business rather than ownership by the
taxpayer is determinative for capitalization purposes.
193 Rev. Rul. 69-331, 1969.1 Cum. Bull. 87.
485
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tising and salary expenses are currently deductible.'" The distinc-
tion is said to be that the expenses held deductible "were found to be
less directly and significantly productive of assets having a value
extending beyond the taxable year in which paid or incurred than is
true in [the case of expenses which had to be capitalized]." 195 The
rulings do not explain what factual differences,, if any, make the
expenses in the one case "more directly and significantly productive"
than those in the other.
The costs of training employees to perform tasks in future years
are probably not capital expenditures, although one case, Cohn v.
United States, 196 held that World War II flying schools' expenses for
training flight instructors were properly capitalized and written off
over the life of the schools. In Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States!" a deduction for the taxpayer's expenses for training em-
ployees in the techniques of television broadcasting was disallowed
on the ground that the taxpayer was not carrying on a television
broadcasting business during the years in question, but in discussing
the capital nature of the training expenses the court observed that
they "might" have been deductible under section 162 had they been
incurred after the taxpayer's television business had begun." 8
The deductibility of business expansion expenses was put
squarely in issue in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner.' 99 The
taxpayer (Loft), a manufadurer and seller of candy, experienced a
substantial loss of business in -the late 1950's, when many of its
customers moved from the cities where Loft's stores were located to
the suburbs. When Loft's suburban stores proved -unprofitable it
undertook a program of selling its candy through independent drug-
stores and other retailers. Loft established a franchise division to
induce suburban stores to sell Loft candy, to enter into franchise
contracts with the stores and to provide services and merchandise to
the stores. The franchise division commenced an intensive advertis-
ing campaign, directed toward retailers rather than consumers of
I" Rev. Rut. 68-561, /968-2 Cum. Bull. 117.
199 Rev. Rut. 69-331, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 87.
I " 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9457 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), affd, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
197 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
199 345 F.2d at 904. Strictly speaking, the amount in question was paid to another
company, Larus, for training personnel who were actually Larus' employees. Before these
costs were incurred, Larus dismissed its own application for a television permit and sub-
scribed to 60% of the taxpayer's voting stock. The training program was thereafter conducted
"for the benefit and convenience of" the taxpayer. Id. In addition to these training expenses,
the taxpayer paid Larus some $25,000 as "reimbursement" for costs previously incurred in its
training program. This latter amount was held to be a capital expenditure, the "asset"
involved apparently being the trained staff. The distinction between the two kinds of payment
is similar to the distinction made between the cost of purchased goodwill, which must be
capitalized, and the cost of developing goodwill, which is an expense. See note 213 infra.
199
 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 171 (1972), rev'd, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
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candy, consisting of advertising in magazines, mailing of circulars,
telephone solicitations and personal visits by salesmen. Retailers
who entered into franchise contracts with Loft agreed to install a
certain kind of display case, to permit Loft to inspect their displays
and to use their "best efforts" to sell Loft candies. In exchange, Loft
paid the retailers a commission on candy sales, gave certain training
and advertising advice, and agreed not to permit others•to sell Loft
candy within a specified area around the stores. The Commissioner
disallowed deductions for approximately two-thirds of the expenses
of Loft's franchise division, including all the division's advertising
expenses, salaries of salesmen, and travel expenses, and portions of
such items as telephone expenses, postage and printing.
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's determination
that a major part of the expenses of Loft's franchise division were
capital expenditures. 20° Finding that benefits to be enjoyed in future
years were the reason for incurring the costs in question, the court
held that those costs should be capitalized as the costs of "contracts
which provided a channel of marketing distribution." 20 ' The court
conceded that the cost of advertising "directed toward current sales"
is currently deductible, but ruled that Loft's advertising was di-
rected not at "promotion of its product" but at "establishing new
channels of distribution for that product." 202 While much of the Tax
Court's opinion indicates that the assets produced by the expendi-
tures were the contracts, there is support also in the opinion for
viewing the "channel of distribution" as an asset separate from
particular contracts. 203
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the expenses of Loft's
franchise division were deductible under section 162. Sweeping lan-
guage in Houston Natural Gas, 2 D4 to the effect that "an intensive
campaign to get new customers at any time gives rise to capital
expenditures,"205 was said to be unacceptable "as an unqualified
general rule." 2 °6 The court turned its attention to the search for an
200 Id.
201 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 176.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 177. The Tax Court relied to a considerable extent upon Houston Natural
Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937), upon
several cases holding that costs incurred in connection with the construction of buildings were
capital expenditures, and upon Manhattan Co., SO T.C. 78 (1968), which involved the cost of
purchasing customer lists.
2" 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937).
207
	 F.2d at 817.
206
	
F.2d at 782. The court purported to distinguish Houston Natural Gas on the
ground that the efforts of the taxpayer in that case succeeded in giving it an "asset" in the
form of a monopoly of the gas business in Houston, since the taxpayer's competitor was driven
into receivership. This distinction, which amounts to making the ordinary and necessary
character of an expense turn on the success of the taxpayer in achieving the goal for which the
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asset created or enhanced by Loft's franchise division, and was
unable to find one with enough substance to support capitalization
of the franchise division's costs. The franchise division itself was not
such an asset since, despite some changes in its internal organiza-
tion, Loft was doing no more than carrying on its old business in a
more intensive way :
 The undefined "intangible asset" said in some
opinions and rulings to be produced by an intensive solicitation
campaign was found to be insufficient, at• least in the absence of
some "clear standards and guidelines" by legislation or regulation to
specify which "intangible assets" are deductible and which are not.
The court was unimpressed with the contracts with retailers, which
the Tax Court had viewed as constituting a "channel of marketing
distribution." 207
 The contracts gave Loft no property interest in the
space used to sell its candy, did not require the retailers to sell any
minimum amount of candy, and gave Loft "little more than an
expectation or hope of future sales.” 2 os Nor was a satisfactory asset
to be found in the "innumerable new suburban customers, . . . good
will .. . and assurance of a suburban market" 209
 which the Com-
missioner argued Loft had obtained by entering into the franchise
contracts. These benefits, said the court, were "no different from
what a number of good commission-paid salesmen in the same
territory would have achieved and such commissions are clearly
deductible under § 162." 2 "
One of the most interesting aspects of Briarcliff is that the case
stands virtually alone. Except, perhaps, for Houston Natural Gas,
the circulation structure cases and certain cases involving research
and development costs, 2 " there appears to be no other case in
which the Commissioner has argued that mere business expansion
expense was incurred, is not very satisfactory. As a general rule, although in some circum-
stances an unsuccessful capital expenditure is deductible as a loss, the distinction between
capital expenditures and ordinary and necessary business expenses should not turn on the
success of the endeavor. See Note, Income Tax Accounting: Business Expense or Capital
Outlay, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 677 (1934); Edward R. Godfrey, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1
(1963), affd, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1965) (cost of unsuccess-
ful attempt to have property rezoned held capital).
2°7
	 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 176.
2" 475 F.2d at 786 n.5.
209
 Id. at 785.
21° Id. at 787.
21' E.g., Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 321 (1955); Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant
Grain Co., 12 T.C. 760 (1949), affd, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950). These cases may be
distinguishable from Briarcliff on the ground that laboratory research is usually directed
toward developing something that is clearly an asset, such as a patent. Thus in
Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant the court said that early research costs, successful and unsuccessful,
should be capitalized as the cost of whatever asset is ultimately developed by the project.
Section 174 now permits a taxpayer to expense research and experimental expenditures or to
deduct them ratably over a period of up to five years (except to the extent they are chargeable
to .depreciable or depletable property).
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costs should be capitalized. The rule that amounts paid for goodwill
in connection with the purchase of a going business are capital
expendituresm does not require capitalization of expenditures in-
curred to develop goodwill. The distinction between the tax treat-
ment of purchased goodwill and that of developed goodwill is
well-established, 213 though the distinction is perhaps attributable
more to the statutory language used to describe capital expenditures
than to any apparent policy considerations. In close cases, capitali-
zation is determined by balancing the nature of the expense as a
contribution to an "improvement" under section 263 with its "ordi-
nary" character under section 162. That a benefit is obtained by
purchase does not make it more of an "improvement," but may
make it less "ordinary." 214 Although goodwill is treated as an asset
when it is transferred as part of the sale of a going business, 2 'S it is
not satisfactory to regard self-developed goodwill as an asset
sufficient to support capitalization, for any benefit that a taxpayer's
activities generate could be called goodwill. If goodwill in the sense
of "assurance of a market" or "new channels of distribution" is to be
regarded as an "asset" as that term was used in Lincoln Savings &
Loan, the search for an asset in capitalization cases will become
merely a test of the Commissioner's ingenuity in putting names to
whatever benefits a taxpayer's activities have created. Accordingly,
the meaning of "asset" in capitalization cases must be limited at least
to recognized kinds of property, such as tangible assets, stock,
patents, copyrights, contracts and licenses. But acceptance of this
limitation does not solve problems like that of Briarcliff, since the
expenses in issue in that case did relate to contracts. It is clear that
at least some contract rights are assets for capitalization purposes.
Indeed, Lincoln Savings & Loan itself involved payments that gave
the taxpayer something quite similar to contract rights. 216 As a
practical matter, the search for rules regarding the extent to which
business expansion costs must be capitalized reduces itself to a
search for rules concerning the capital nature of payments relating to
contracts and licenses, 217 for the circulation expense and research
212 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(h) (1973).
21J
	
Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of
Purchased Goodwill, 81 nary. L. Rev. 859 (1968).
214 It may be easier to regard the costs of expansion through intensification of past
activities as "ordinary" expenditures than to say that the cost of purchasing an entire business
is an ordinary expense. And it is easier to regard something as an asset when a taxpayer has
purchased it than when it is built up gradually.
215 In essence, goodwill is whatever is transferred other than specific assets to which a
portion of the purchase price has been allocated.
215 See text at note 229 infra.
217 Licenses are not contracts, but for capital expenditure purposes the two seem
sufficiently similar to be treated together,
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and experimental expense problems have now been largely - mooted
by statute, and payments that give the taxpayer something less
substantial than the contracts in Briarcliff seem clearly
noncapita1. 218
 Classification of expenditures made in connection
with contract rights as capital or- current turns on two factors: the
relation of the payment to the contract, and the nature of the
contract.
Amounts paid directly for a contract, license or similar right (in
the sense that they constitute consideration for the creation of the
right or for its assignment to the taxpayer) have generally been held
to be capital expenditures. 219
 These authorities suggest that if the
21 ' There are, however, some odd situations involving expenditures that probably should
be capitalized, but which are not readily characterized as expenditures that produce an asset.
For example, in L.M. Brown Abstract Co., 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1943), the taxpayer
purchased a set of title abstracts in order to prevent their falling into the hands of a
competitor, and destroyed the records. Lincoln Savings & Loan seems to undermine the
court's statement that the cost of eliminating competition is a capital expenditure. Capitaliza-
tion in such a case may perhaps be based on the abstracts themselves being the necessary
asset. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case the cost of the abstracts (though not the
abstracts themselves) may be viewed as having continued utility in the taxpayer's business
throughout the period when a competitor could have used the records. Had the taxpayer
achieved its goal by paying the original owner to destroy his records, the necessary asset might
be found in the owner's contractual agreement.
A similar problem arises in connection with payments to release the taxpayer from an
onerous contract. Such payments have generally been held deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses. See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 901 (7th
Cir. 1956); Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948)
(lessee purchased fee to be rid of onerous lease; excess of purchase price over value of property
deductible); Helvering v. Community Bond & Mortgage Corp., 74 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1935)
(purchase of stock); Metropolitan Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. Ohio 1959);
Montana Power Co. v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 943 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Olympia Harbor
Lumber Co., 30 B.T.A. 114 (1934), affd on other issues, 79 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1935);
Denholm & McKay Co., 2 B.T.A. 444, acquiesced in, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 2 (1925); Pressed Steel
Car Co., 20 T.C. 198 (1953), acquiesced in, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 8 (purchase of stock); Stuart
Co., 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 585 (1950), aff'd, 195 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1952). But in the similar
situation where a corporation pays a call premium to retire stock in order to obtain new
financing at better terms, the call premium is a capital expenditure. See H. & G. Indus., Inc.,
T.C. No. 20 (April 30, 1973). In Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United
States, 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968), the taxpayer made
payments to its supplier (Coca-Cola) to induce the supplier to purchase and dissolve a
company (Croswell) through which the taxpayer's dealings with CoCa-Cola had been con-
ducted. After the dissolution o(Croswell, the taxpayer entered into contracts of indefinite
duration with CoCa-Cola. The court rejected the district court's ruling that payments to be
relieved of an onerous contract are per as capital expenditures, but required capitalization
because the taxpayer received a "positive business benefit" in the form of its contracts with
Coca-Cola. The distinction thus drawn between Darlington-Hartsville and the other cases
cited above does not seem particularly desirable as a matter of policy, but it is consistent with
the limitation of capital expenditures to costs that produce or enhance an asset.
Another expenditure related to future years' business activities but not productive of an
asset is the cost of a management survey. See, e.g., Goodwyn Crockery Co., 37 T.C. 355
(1961), afrd, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963) (deductible).
219
 See, e.g., Vermont Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955) (franchise to operate bus line);' Hampton Pontiac, Inc. v. United
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taxpayer in Briarcliff had paid lump sums to the retailers with
whom it dealt in order to induce them to enter into agency contracts,
the payments might have been capital expenditures notwithstanding
the meagerness of the rights the taxpayer obtained. 220 The opinion is
not very clear on this point, but the court's repeated reference to the
difficulties of classifying "intangible contributions" to "intangible
assets" suggests a recognition of this distinction. As in the case of
payments to acquire goodwill, the classification of payments to
acquire contract rights as capital or current may turn not only on
what the taxpayer acquires, but on how he acquires it. But the
Briarcliff court's primary emphasis was upon the meagerness of the
rights obtained by the taxpayer's contracts rather than upon the
indirect way in which the costs in question contributed to the
acquisition of those rights. Indirect contract costs such as payments
to brokers for negotiating contracts and legal and other fees paid in
connection with a license application have been held to be capital
expenditures. 221 Briarcliff can be reconciled with these cases only if
States, 294 F. Supp. 1073 (D.S.C. 1969) (automobile dealership franchise); Darrell D, Hud-
gins, 55 T.C. 534 (1970) (payment to employer to get a promotion); George Wynn Smith, 55
T.C. 133 (1970) (payment to obtain "upland cotton acreage allotments"); Arthur E. Ryman,
Jr., 51 T.C. 799 (1969) (payment by taw professor to become member of a second state's bar);
Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 30 T.C. 84 (1958), affd, 276 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1960) (club member-
ship); Tube Bar, Inc., 15 T.C. 922 (1950) (liquor license); Morris Nachman, 12 T.C. 1204
(1949), affd, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951) (same); American Seating Co., 4 B.T.A. 649 (1926)
(right to use unpatented inventions); Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 Cum. Bull. 104 (contract of
professional athlete); Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 127 (same); Rev. Rul. 66-58,
1966-1 Cum. Bull. 186 (cotton acreage allotment); Rev. Rut. 65-228, 1965-2 Cum. Bull. 43
(milk base). Payments for franchises, trademarks and trade names have been the subject of
statutory tinkering; under § 1253(d) amounts paid for a franchise, trademark or trade name
are deductible if they are contingent on productivity or use; other payments for such assets are
in certain circumstances deductible in the year of payment or ratably over the life of the
agreement or a ten-year period, under § 1253(d)(2).
220 In Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1958), a current
deduction was allowed for payments by the taxpayer for the right to purchase, for an unstated
period, its requirements of raw materials at prices to be agreed upon in the future, I)eductibil-
ity was based upon the fact that no enforceable contract was created by the payment; the
taxpayer received only "an expectation or hope that it would be preferred over other possible
purchasers." Id. at 213. Although the Second Circuit cited Van !dentine as supporting its
decision in Briarcliff, the contracts in the tatter case at least required the retailers to use their
"best,efforts" to sell the taxpayer's candy, and thus could not be said to be without considera-
tion. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 188 N.E. 214 (1917).
221 See, e.g., Griffiths v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1934) (attorney's fees and
commissions for negotiating lease); Central Bank Block Ass'n v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir. 1932) (commission for negotiating lease); KWTX Broadcasting Co., Inc., 31 T.C. 952,
affd, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959) (legal fees and other costs of applying for a television
broadcasting license); Radio Station WBIR, Inc., 31 T.C. 803 (1959) (same); George W.
Knipe, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1965), affd on other issues sub nom. Equitable Publish-
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966) (same);
Rev. Rul. 67-113, 1967-I Cum. Bull. 55 (cost of airline's acquisition of certification of public
convenience from CAB); Rev. Rul. 56-520, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 170 (television license). But see
All States Freight, Inc. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ohio 1947), where the costs
of a hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission were ruled deductible because the
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some distinction can be found in the nature of the contract rights
involved. Considerations of clear reflection of income may suggest a
basis for such distinctions.
The real problem in matching expenses with income in a case
like Briarcliff is not capitalization; it is the lack of a satisfactory
mechanism for recovering costs once they have been capitalized.
Ideally, the costs of a special advertising campaign, or of training
employees in new techniques, or of obtaining new customers should
be capitalized and amortized over whatever period results in match-
ing those costs against the revenues they were incurred to produce.
But it is inconceivable that amortization of such costs would be
allowed. The Commissioner argued in Briarcliff that the "asset"
representing the taxpayer's expenditures had an indefinite useful life
and could not be amortized; 222
 the Tax Court was not sure the issue
had been raised, but noted its agreement with the Commissioner's
position. 223 Even where it is reasonably clear that an intangible
benefit decreases in utility over the years the courts have been
reluctant to allow amortization. 224 In the absence of a feasible
method of amortizing costs like those in Briarcliff, a current deduc-
tion may be preferable to capitalization as a method of clearly
reflecting income. A deduction will at least result in the taxation of
only net income, while capitalization may deny or unduly postpone
any tax effect in the case of costs that should at most be deferred for
a relatively short period. The effect of capitalization will be to give
the costs tax effect only in the year when the business is sold or
terminated; if the costs are rightly thought of as the costs of earning
taxpayer would have received a license without a hearing if other carriers had not filed a
petition to stay its issuance. The court ruled that the expenditures were deductible because
they were incurred to protect an existing business rather than to obtain a new one.
222 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 177.
"3 Id.
224 In the case of purchased customer lists, for example, where the declining utility of the
list can readily be measured by the number of customers who cease to deal with the taxpayer,
amortization has been denied on the theory that the acquisition of the list gave the taxpayer
goodwill or some such asset above and beyond the opportunity to deal with particular
customers. See, e.g., Wiklc v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9403 (N.D. Ala. 1965);
Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), aff 'd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); Anchor
Cleaning Serv., Inc., 22 T.C. 1029 (1954). The Tax Court has, rather grudgingly, allowed
amortization of 75% of the cost of a customer list; four judges would have allowed amortiza-
tion of the entire cost. Manhattan Co., 50 T.C. 78 (1968). The Fifth Circuit has recently
allowed amortization of the entire cost of a customer list where the taxpayer established
through the testimony of its officers and employees, and through evidence of market condi-
tions,"that the list had an ascertainable value apart from goodwill and an ascertainable useful
life. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.'United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973). Many
of the costs in the nature of "business expansion costs" produce benefits whose declining—utility
is even less measurable than that of customer lists. An advertising campaign, for example, is
likely to have effects that fall off rapidly with time. While precise determination of the
decrease in utility is impossible, everyone would agree that it is present.
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income in years close to that in which they are incurred, such a
postponement would seem to distort income more than a current
deduction would. -
The inability of the taxpayer to recover captialized costs in a
case like Briarcliff may justify allowing the current deduction of
such costs, but there are many cases in which costs associated with
contract rights and similar assets should be capitalized. The clearest
kind of case involves prepaid expenses. Cash basis taxpayers have
frequently been denied a deduction for amounts paid for future
years' interest, insurance, rent or services, 225 though there is some
authority to the contrary. 226 Since such costs, once capitalized, may
be written off in the period in which the services are performed,
capitalization is an entirely satisfactory way of matching expenses
with the appropriate income. The prepaid expense cases are some-
times explained solely on the ground that postponement of a deduc-
tion is necessary in order clearly to reflect income, without mention
of capital expenditure principles. This rationale is not very satisfac-
tory, since "clear reflection of income" is generally thought of as a
standard for judging the adequacy of an accounting method, rather
than as an accounting method in and of itself. The present state of
affairs involving prepaid expenses is that some kinds of prepaid
expenses are currently deductible, some are not, and some are
treated on a case-by-case basis, with the determining factor in close
cases being the Commissioner's concern over whether taxpayers are
"abusing" prepayment. 227 Recognition that the prepaid expense
cases involve capital expenditures, and consistent application of the
requirement of capitalization, would bring uniformity to this area of
the law, which one authority has described as a "jumble." 228 'The
prepaid expense cases present the best possible case for capitaliza-
tion of costs relating to contract rights. Capitalization of prepaid
expenses leads to the clearest possible reflection of income, and the
contract rights in question are an entirely satisfactory kind of asset,
since the period in which the benefits of the expense are realized can
be determined with accuracy.
Closely related to the prepaid expense cases are cases in which
the taxpayer obtains contract or other rights providing precisely
ascertainable benefits in future years and in which the.rights do not
225 The leading case is Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir.
1942), involving prepaid insurance. See generally Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 36 (1968).
22e See, e.g., Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959); Caddis v, United
Slates, 330 F, Supp, 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), acquiesced in,
1959-2 Cum. Bull. 4; Rev. Rul. 71-252, 1971-1 Cum. Bull. 146.
227 See Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 76:
228 See Asimow, supra note 225, at 74.
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diminish in value. This was the case in Lincoln Savings & Loan,
where the "additional premiums" in issue gave the taxpayer a share
in the "Secondary Reserve" of the Federal Savings and Loan InsurJ
ante Corporation, which .share was to be used to discharge the
taxpayer's obligation to pay insurance premiums under certain
defined circumstances and was returnable to the taxpayer if it ceased
to be insured or upon liquidation. If this was not a prepaid insur-
ance case, it was at least very similar. 229
From the point of view of clear reflection of income, the cases
involving capitalization of the costs of licenses are not as satisfactory
as the prepaid income cases since the effect of capitalization is to
give a cost of engaging in business over many years tax effect only in
the year the license is lost or the business is terminated. In the case
of a license that is not transferable this is certainly a distortion of
income, but the cost is clearly capital and there seems to be no
reasonable way to spread it over more than one business year under
current law. The comparable problem of the organizational costs of
a business has been solved by allowing amortization over a five year
period."°
As a matter of clear reflection of income, the contract rights
cases thus range from those in which capitalization is clearly desira-
ble (the prepaid expense cases) to those in which capitalization is
demonstrably unsatisfactory (Briarcliff). In all of these cases, the
desirability of capitalization turns upon the possibility of recovering
costs once they have been capitalized. The factors that caused the
Briarcliff court to regard the contracts in that case as something
other than assets are the same factors that make depreciation of the
costs of those contracts impossible. This parallelism justifies tying
the capitalization rules to the depreciation rules by saying that a
benefit is not an asset for capitalization purposes if it is so im-
measurable and nebulous that its useful life, while known to be
short, cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to allow
229
 The taxpayer argued in Lincoln Savings & Loan that the reserve might be consumed
by losses of the FSLIC, a circumstance that is not present in the typical prepaid insurance
case. But, as the Court noted, the possibility of such a loss exists with any investment in a
bank or insurance company and does not make such an investment noncapital. 403 U.S. at
357.
220 'See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 248. The nondepreciability of organization costs or
nontransferable licenses results from the impossibility of predicting the useful life of the
taxpayer's business, while the nondepreciability of advertising costs is due to the impossibility
of estimating the useful life of the cost itself, irrespective of the measurability of the life of the
business. Unlike advertising costs, organizational costs and the cost of licenses cannot be
regarded as wasting "assets." Therefore, Briarcliff does not support the deductibility of the
cost of licenses. Where a cost, such as that of a license, does not provide benefits that decrease
with time, Lincoln Savings & Loan clearly bars a deduction, even though that result may be
more or less (depending on the actual duration of the business) unfortunate as a matter of
taxation of only net income.
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depreciation. 231 Another possible approach is suggested by Cincin-
nati Ry. 232 Just as the costs in that case were currently deductible
even though they produced assets, where a deduction was shown to
be satisfactory on clear reflection of income grounds, costs relating
to contract rights might be viewed as always producing assets but
still deductible whenever the cost can be shown to be both
short-lived and nondepreciable. It is sometimes said that capitaliza-
tion questions should be decided without regard to depreciation,
that capitalization and depreciation are separate issues, and that if
the depreciation rules for intangibles are inadequate the solution is
for Congress to improve those rules. 233 But there is no reason to
think that the depreciation situation will soon change, and until it
does whatever flexibility exists with regard to capitalization should
be exercised in such a way as to produce the best possible income
figure, a process that requires coordination of the capitalization rules
with the depreciation rules. "It is no bad thing that the law of the
land should here and there conform with the known facts of every-
day experience."234
Although defining contract rights like those in Briarcliff as
something other than assets serves to increase the likelihood that
only net income will be taxed in the case of taxpayers who are
expanding existing businesses, taxpayers who incur similar expenses
in connection with new businesses may run afoul of the requirement
that expenses be incurred "in carrying on [a] trade or business" to be
deductible under section 162. The tax benefit of expenditures not
productive of assets will frequently be lost to such taxpayers because
the expenditures, even if nonpersonal and currently deductible
under Lincoln Savings & Loan, are not deductible when incurred
231 The writer understands that revenue agents have taken the position that the costs of
employee training programs are capital expenditures. As in the case of the expenditures
discussed in the text, the desirability of capitalizing these costs depends upon the possibility of
amortization. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965),
denied amortization of the costs of training the taxpayer's employees over the period for which
its broadcasting license was issued on the ground that the license had an indefinite useful life.
If a taxpayer can establish "from experience or other factors," Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1973),
that its trained employees can be expected, on the average, to work for some reasonably
ascertainable period, or that their training will become obsolete at a foreseeable time, amorti-
zation should be allowed. At the very least, a deduction for an appropriate portion of the cost
of a training program should be allowed whenever a trained employee stops working. If
amortization of training costs is permitted, there should be no reasonable objection to
capitalizing those costs. The necessary asset may be found in the employment contracts of the
trained staff. But cf. David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970), where the court's allowance of a
deduction for an employment agency fee implies that the fee is not part of the cost of the
taxpayer's employment contract or that the contract is not an asset for capitalization purposes.
232
 See text at notes 49-52 supra.
233
 See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 225, at 61; Note, An Inquiry Into the Nature of
Goodwill, 53 Colum. L. Rev, 660, 719 (1953).
234
 A. Herbert, The Reasonable Man, in Uncommon Law 1, 6 (1969).
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because of the wording of section 162, and not deductible after the
trade or business is begun because of the lack of a depreciable or
amortizable asset. It is anomalous that business-related expenditures
like these should be nondeductible under a system based on taxation
of net income. This anomaly, which is aggravated by restrictive
definitions of "trade or business," is not caused by capital expendi-
ture rules, and the occasional tendency to describe non-trade or
business investigatory expenses as "capital expenditures" should be
discouraged, for that description engenders confusion and gives the
nondeductibility of such expenditures an undeserved aura of legiti-
macy by describing the expenditures in language usually indicative
of a sound reason for nondeductibility.
CONCLUSION
If the restriction of the requirement of capitalization to costs
that produce or enhance an asset serves any useful function, it is the
separation of costs like those in Briarcliff from those producing more
precisely ascertainable benefits. If the asset produced by an expendi-
ture is tangible property, or a measurable kind of intangible prop-
erty like a contract for services to be performed in a particular
future period, there is no reason to be restrictive about the costs that
must be capitalized, since those costs will be matched with the
income they help generate through depreciation or amortization. But
in cases like Briarcliff, or in cases involving many educational
expenditures or the costs of obtaining a new job, the • nebulous and
short-lived character of the benefits purchased by the expenditure,
together with the lack of a reasonable method of giving the costs tax
effect other than by a current deduction, may justify deductibility.
Query whether limiting capitalization to costs that "produce or
enhance . . . a separate and distinct additional asset" will explain
satisfactorily the kind of distinctions that seem desirable in this area.
In the case of contract rights, refinements based on distinctions
between direct and indirect payments for a contract and upon the
nature of the rights granted by the contract seem necessary.
The need for classifying rights'or benefits as "property" is not
confined to the capital expenditure area. The benefits of capital
gains taxation, for example, are limited to gains from the sale of
" pro per ty," 235 and only "property" can be transferred tax-free to a
controlled corporation or partnership. 236 Unfortunately, close cases
in these areas sometimes seem to be decided by a process of labeling
the rights in question as "property" or "not property" rather than by
235 Int, Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1021, 1031.
236 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 351, 721.
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analysis of the interests involved. 237 It is to be hoped that the
limitation of capital expenditures to costs that produce or enhance
an asset will not be viewed as a license to engage in a mechanical
process of labeling benefits as "an asset" or "not an asset."
A danger more subtle than that of decision by labeling is that of
attempting to devise all-inclusive definitions of concepts such as
"property" or "asset." Attempts at such definitions have not been
successful even in the capital gains area, 238 where a wealth of
decided cases might have been expected to provide the data from
which a general definition could be drawn or to serve as standards
for testing the adequacy of proposed definitions. Two definitions of
"asset" for capital expenditure purposes are suggested by recent
cases. Neither is very satisfactory. In United States v. Mississippi
Chemical Carp., 239 the Supreme Court held that the cost of purchas-
ing Class C stock in a bank for cooperatives established by the
Farm Credit Act of 1933 was a capital expenditure. The Court's
opinion refers to the stock's being "a capital asset within the mean-
ing of § 1 2 2 1." 24° The policy considerations underlying the taxation
of capital gains have no apparent relation to those involved in
disallowing a deduction for capital expenditures, and it is to be
hoped that Mississippi Chemical will not be read as approving the
application of capital gains learning to capital expenditure problems.
231 See, e.g., Estate of John F. Shea, 57 . T.C. 15 (1971), where gain on the sale of a
charter party (a contract giving the owner the right to earn income by transporting goods by
sea) was held taxable at capital gain rates because the charter party was "property," A more
sophisticated approach to this kind of problem is presented in Commissioner v. P.C. Lake,
Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), where the proceeds of the sale of carved-out oil production
payments were taxed as ordinary income, notwithstanding that the production payments were
property under non-tax principles.
A comparable problem under § 351 involves the transfer of accounts receivable to a
controlled corporation. Section 351 makes tax-free the transfer of property, but not of
services, to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock. Although accounts receivable are
certainly property as that term is normally used, it is not self-evident that the accounts
receivable of a cash-basis taxpayer should be treated as property for purposes of § 351, since
to do so and to hold that collection of the receivables is taxable to the transferee seems to
contravene the "first principle of income taxation: that income must be taxed to him who
earns it." Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739.40 (1949). But see Hempt Bros.,
Inc. v. United States, 74-I U.S. Tax Cas. 9188 (3d Cir. 1974).
138 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962), where the court's
scholarly analysis of whether the contracts in question were property may be criticized as not
responsive to the issue of whether the payments for the contracts were so closely a substitute
for ordinary income earned by the taxpayer's own efforts that they should have been taxed as
ordinary income.
2" 405 U.S. 298 (1972).
240 Id. at 310. The Syllabus states that "Mlle Government contended that the stock is a
capital asset as defined by ... § 1221, and is non-deductible," but the Government's brief
pointed out, in response to the taxpayers' contention that the Corn Products doctrine helped
their case, that "the issue is whether the stock purchased is an asset, not whether it is a capital
asset." Brief for Petitioner at 37 n.33, United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298
(1972). See Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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In Briarcliff the Second Circuit stated that the product of an expen-
diture is a capital asset (for purposes of section 263) "if at the time it
is furnished to the company, it has an ascertainable and measurable
value—that is, a value in money or a fair market value. ))241 This
definition seems inadequate as a means of resolving any but the
clearest cases. Many expenditures clearly capital—the cost of a
nontransferable license, or stock in a closely-held corporation, for
example—produce benefits no more susceptible to precise
valuation242
 than benefits that are not assets. Measurability of the
benefits of an expenditure in terms of time may be relevant in
capitalization cases, 243 but there is no reason why measurability in
terms of dollar value should determine whether a cost must be
capitalized. 244
241 475 F.2d at 784.
241 it will not do to say that the amount spent is a measure of the value of the asset, since
this would make everything an asset, which is clearly not what the court intended.
243 See text at notes 230-31 supra.
244
 An expenditure is not currently deductible even in part merely because the asset it
produces is worth less than the amount of the expenditure. United States v. Mississippi Chem.
Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972).
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